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Figure 1. Leites and Wolf’s insurgency as a system. (Reprinted from Nathan Leites 
and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on 
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A.  RELEVANCE 
So policy converts the overwhelmingly destructive element of war into a 
mere instrument.  It changes the terrible battlesword that a man needs 
both hands and his entire strength to wield, and with which he strikes 
home once and no more, into a light, handy rapier—sometimes just a foil 
for the exchange of thrusts, feints and parries. 
- Karl von Clausewitz, On War  
Ever since the invention of the airplane a century ago, airpower advocates have 
found it to be a useful weapon for enforcing authority.  Airpower in the coercive role 
historically has made a powerful battlesword.  Following World War II, however, there 
emerged an era of nationalist and communist-led insurgencies and limited wars of 
territorial dispute.  These small wars required new operational and tactical innovations 
involving the use of airpower as the very nature of these wars greatly differed from that 
of conventional state-on-state conflict which most of aviation was geared towards.  The 
battlesword was no longer the optimal weapon for these engagements.   
Small wars are conflicts where the political and diplomatic context, and not the 
military disposition of the combatants, is usually the determining factor.  The paradox of 
small wars from an airpower standpoint is that the more asymmetric military capabilities 
become, the less advantage they afford against an adversary disposed to use his 
asymmetric strengths.  A danger manifests itself in a competent adversary who realizes 
“they cannot survive in the environment our technical capabilities have created.  
Ironically, the interplay of our superior military capabilities with the recognition of this 
fact by our adversaries will ensure the character of future wars will be such that our 
‘asymmetric’ technological advantages will be substantially diminished.”1 
Unfortunately, military technology and airpower capability have created a vision 
of airpower that focuses more on the lethality of weaponry instead of on the use of that 
weaponry as a political tool.2   Such a lethality-centered force optimized to fight large, 
                                                 
1 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars (Draft) (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy); 
http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/2003SmallWars.asp (accessed May 2005), 10. 
2 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: 
Free Press, 1989), 203. 
2 
interstate conflicts, by definition, ensures that this force is sub-optimal for waging small 
wars.  Perhaps even more importantly, however, small war theory continues to be 
woefully absent from aviation theory and doctrine.3  This general attitude of indifference 
to the uniqueness of small wars is contrary to a torrent of well-documented literature 
indicating that this form of warfare is the most likely kind of future conflict, is 
fundamentally different from “conventional” warfare, and requires something other than 
conventional measures.4  The question naturally arises, what can airpower offer within 
the rubric of small wars?   
The answer to this question can be found by taking one step back and analyzing 
the role and effectiveness that airpower played in previous small wars.  As author Max 
Boot eloquently suggests, “The past is an uncertain guide to the future, but it is the only 
one we have.”5   By understanding the capabilities of airpower within a historical 
perspective we are able to take two steps forward with an understanding of the 
operational necessities to successfully engage in small, as well as large wars. 
B.   PURPOSE 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the proper application of airpower in small wars given the historical 
precedents set during a broad range of previous wars waged at the sub-state level? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• Exactly what is a small war and is this the most effective term to describe 
sub-state warfare? 
• What is the most appropriate definition for airpower? 
• Small wars predate the comparatively short history of airpower.  Is there a 
realistic breakpoint for applicable research? 
• What historical case studies within this timeline provide relevant parallels 
to possible small wars of the future? 
• What prominent examples of small wars should not be included in the 
analysis? 
                                                 
3 For an excellent argument on this point see Maj Kenneth Beebe, “The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine: 
How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency,” Air & Space Power Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 
27-34. 
4 Colonel Dennis Drew, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas and 
Doctrinal Proposals (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 2. 
5 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002), 336. 
3 
• What principles gleaned from experiences can be applied to the use of 
airpower in future small wars? 
C.  SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Definitions 
Authors and historians have used terms such as small war, limited war, operations 
other than war, and irregular war in various ways and often interchangeably.  In order to 
avoid obfuscation it is necessary to provide a brief etymology of such terms. 
During the majority of the post World War II era, most wars were made part of 
the larger superpower struggle.  By the 1960s, the focus was almost entirely on 
counterinsurgency and methods associated with it.  In the 1980s this conceptualization 
broadened to the term “low-intensity conflict” or LIC.6  The 1990 release of army and air 
force doctrine defined LIC as: 
A political-military confrontation between contending states or groups 
below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition 
among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing 
principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion 
to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, 
employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. 
Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, 
but contain regional and global security implications.7 
Airpower theorist, Dr. Dennis Drew, suggests that low-intensity conflict “is a 
dismally poor title for a type of warfare in which thousands die, countless more are 
physically or psychologically maimed and, in the process, the fate of nations hangs in the 
balance.”8   He further suggests that: 
Worse than being nondescriptive, the term low-intensity conflict is 
chauvinistic, the product of a proud superpower seeing only its own 
version of reality. What Americans have titled low-intensity conflicts may 
have been minor affairs in the life of a superpower. However, to other 
nations and peoples—those directly involved—they are no small affairs.  
To those nations, such conflicts have been passionate, all-consuming 
struggles.9 
                                                 
6 Steven Metz, “Small Wars: From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges,” in Rethinking the 
Principles of War, ed. Anthony D. Mc Ivor (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 287.   
7 U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20/AFM 3-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. 
8 Drew, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 3. 
9 Drew, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 3. 
4 
During the 1990s the phrase “military operations other than war” or MOOTW 
replaced low-intensity conflict.  Such a change was more semantic than significant as 
counterinsurgency operations became less dominant compared to international 
peacekeeping and counterterrorism.10  MOOTW represents, at best, a catchall phrase to 
include anything at the low end of the spectrum of warfare—mainly anything other than 
major conventional or nuclear war.11 
The term “small war” originated in the late nineteenth century.  C.E. Callwell in 
his influential work, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice defined the term as “all 
campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops.”12  
This thesis instead uses the definition put forward in the U.S. Marine Corps 1940 Small 
Wars Manual: small wars are “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein 
military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of 
another state whose government is unstable, inadequate or unsatisfactory for the 
preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of [the 
nation].”13  The term does not necessarily refer to the size or scope of the war; instead, it 
refers to the political and diplomatic context in which the war is fought.  In essence, “in a 
major war, the mission assigned to the armed forces is usually unequivocal—the defeat 
and destruction of the hostile forces.  This is seldom true in small wars.”  The more 
ambiguous mission in a small war: “to establish and maintain law and order by 
supporting or replacing the civil government in countries or areas in which the interest of 
the [country] have been placed in jeopardy.”14 
Dr. David Dean devised a simple, three-level framework for a military to be 
effective in small wars.  These three levels included: assistance, integration, and 
intervention.15  Assistance deals primarily with noncombat training and support directly 
                                                 
10 Metz, “Small Wars,” 287.   
11 Beebe, “The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine,” 29.   
12 Colonel C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 3rd ed. (Lincoln, NE: Bison 
Books, 1996), 21. 
13 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), 1. 
14 Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 284.   
15 Lieutenant Colonel David J. Dean, “The USAF In Low-Intensity Conflict: The Special Air Warfare 
Center” Air University Review, January-February 1985,  
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/jan-feb/dean.html, (accessed January 
2006). 
5 
to friendly airpower forces.  Integration is more colloquially referred to as Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID).  While a vitally important and seldom appreciated aspect of small 
wars, this work purposely omits this level of interaction to focus on the more narrow 
aspect of foreign “intervention” in small wars.16  
The parsing of these terms is important for the delineation of conceptual ideas and 
doctrinal definitions.  Professor Andrew Bacevich, however, cogently advises against 
relying too heavily on mere definitions given such an important subject:  
Let us not comfort ourselves with innocuous labels like nation-building or 
internal defense and development.  Nor should we be misled by pedantic 
definition of insurgency or ‘national liberation.’ Recognize that more is 
involved than supporting some doctrine named for a departed president.  
Look beyond the functions of security assistance, training, and advice.  
Call it war, and having done so, act accordingly.17 
2. Case Study Selection 
The use of multiple case studies can be traced to the champion of the indirect 
approach, B.H. Liddell Hart.  He correctly warned: “The method in recent generations 
has been to select one or two campaigns, and to study them exhaustively as a means of 
professional training and as the foundation of military theory.  But with such a limited 
basis the continual changes in military means from war to war carry the danger that our 
outlook will be narrow and the lesson fallacious.”18   The use of the particular six case 
studies in this thesis attempts to avoid this particular pitfall by representing what can best 
be described as a continuum of small wars. 
The cases are similar in many regards.  Each involves a prominent and technically 
capable Western power embroiled in a post World War II small war.  Selecting cases 
from this period provides the most salient break point for analyzing the role of airpower 
as all of the nations involved enjoyed airpower capabilities that accurately mirror those of 
                                                 
16 Airpower units constructed to perform FID missions are ruefully diminutive when compared to the 
juggernaut of those that execute conventionally-minded operations.  The United States Air Force (USAF) is 
a case in point.  As of this writing, the 6th Special Operations Squadron, located at Hurlburt Field, FL, is 
the only USAF unit dedicated to Foreign Internal Defense missions and helping cooperating governments 
plan counterinsurgency efforts.  See Norman J. Brozenick, Jr., Small Wars, Big Stakes: Coercion, 
Persuasion, and Airpower in Counterrevolutionary War (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: School of 
Advanced Airpower Studies, June 1998), 6. 
17 A. J. Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador 
(Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 50-51. 
18 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991), 4. 
6 
the present day.  Each protagonist had available the capability and personnel to utilize 
both fixed and rotary-wing assets, propeller and jet-powered craft, and airpower assets 
from dedicated air forces as well as naval and army branches.  Thus, airpower, as referred 
to in this work, consists of any capability to exploit the medium above the Earth’s 
surface.   
More importantly, however, the differences these six cases embody provide a 
representative sample from the wide array of small wars of intervention.19  These range 
from insurrections and rebellions to internal civil wars and territorial disputes.  
Opposition strategies and support bases similarly embody an array of differences.  Not 
surprisingly, in the Cold War era following World War II many small wars developed 
due to ideological differences.  This work investigates several such cases but also 
examines religious, ethnic, and economic foundations for hostilities.  Finally, and 
essential for analyzing the role and effectiveness of airpower, these cases represent a vast 
array of topographic and climactic settings; from vast deserts to dense jungles and 
weather conditions ranging from sweltering heat to frigid Antarctic cold. 
While not necessarily definitive, six case studies sufficiently demonstrate the 
validity of the conceptual framework presented here.  Again, the complex nature of the 
subject of small wars defies facile generalizations.  The framework presented here 
attempts to emphasize practicality over mere theory.20  
D.   ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II serves to introduce the conceptual framework for analysis by 
describing the model originally put forward by Rand researchers Nathan Leites and 
Charles Wolf in Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts.  By 
analyzing insurgent conflict as a system, these authors developed a four-stage strategy to 
defeat insurgencies based on their implicit vulnerabilities.  The analysis of this 
multifaceted strategy, and generalizations regarding the role of airpower within the 
strategy, lay the foundation for the analysis of each of the case studies. 
                                                 
19 The Marine Corps Small Wars Center of Excellence currently lists 407 current and previous “small 
wars.”  See http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc/mil/sw_today.asp (accessed June 2005). 
20 Bard O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C.: 
Potomac Books, 2005), 199. 
7 
The six case studies comprise Chapters III, IV, and V.  Individual chapters 
contain two case studies for a particular Western nation.  For consistency, I structure each 
case study similarly.  This includes:  background information, environmental factors such 
as topographic and demographic information, opposition strategies, and popular and 
external support for the opposition.  Following the background information, I discuss 
airpower assets involved and apply the Leites and Wolf analytical framework to assess 
the role of airpower.  Each chapter concludes with a brief analysis of the role of airpower 
utilized by the particular Western nation in the two given small wars.  In Chapter III, I 
present the involvement of Great Britain in both the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) 
and the Falklands Campaign of 1982.21  In Chapter IV, I cover the French struggles in 
Indochina (1946-1954) and in Algerian (1954-1962).  Finally, in Chapter V, I present 
select examples of the United States’ small wars in the Anti-Huk Campaign (1946-1955) 
and the civil war in El Salvador (1980-1992).22 
In Chapter VI, I briefly review each of the four strategies as laid out within the 
Leites and Wolf framework.  I provide an analysis of the framework itself, and discuss 
insights not adequately covered by the framework.  Chapter VII is my concluding chapter 
where I summarize my analysis and identify additional considerations for the application 
of airpower in small wars. 
E.   BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
If the most likely type of war in which the United States may become involved in 
the years ahead is a small war, then it is critically important to examine past experiences 
in that area.  The British, French, and United States have all used airpower in small wars 
                                                 
21 A common notion regarding the British use of airpower in a small war context is that of the “air 
control” doctrine especially in the period between the world wars.  While the idea of controlling a country 
by airpower is attractive to airmen and the casualty adverse, the history of air control reveals little to 
support the idea of policing or peacekeeping by airpower alone.  The few cases where it was effective were 
“the most minor kinds of tribal police operations.”  Otherwise, some contingent of ground troops was 
necessary for peacekeeping operation.  See James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small 
Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), especially 
chap. 2, “Colonial Air Control,” 51-86.  Other references include James S. Corum, “The Myth of Air 
Control,” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 61-77; Maj Mark Dippold, “Air Occupation: 
Asking the Right Questions,” Airpower Journal 11, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 78; Bruce Hoffman, British Air 
Control in Peripheral Conflict, 1919–1976 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1989). 
22 This thesis purposefully does not cover the use of airpower during the United States experience in 
Vietnam due to the vast quantities of literature on the subject and the lingering visceral reaction the subject 
generates.  Instead, these two case studies provide less contentious examples of successful campaigns with 
more definitive involvement of airpower that both supported as well as undermined the socio-political 
aspect of the conflict.   
8 
and these efforts and experiences are worthy of attention.23  The understanding of how 
airpower does, and more importantly, does not support the greater political strategy in 
small wars is paramount to the success of these endeavors.  As the former president of the 
Naval War College reflected, “The nation’s military force must be an adaptive instrument 
of national power.  It must provide political utility across a much more diverse and 
difficult range of scenarios and circumstances.  This force must act as a flexible 
instrument of policy engagement, not simply a larger sheaf of thunderbolts.”24  
 
 
                                                 
23 Dean, “The USAF in Low-Intensity Conflict,” 9.   
24 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, introduction to Rethinking the Principles of War, ed. Anthony 
D. Mc Ivor ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), xiii. 
9 
II. LEITES AND WOLF SYSTEM MODEL 
A. BACKGROUND ON ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS 
The study of small wars and especially insurgencies and counterinsurgency 
methods increased during the latter half of the twentieth century as the subject is rich 
with considerable experience and empirical data.25  Many models describe and analyze 
the varied factors in small wars.  The creators of these frameworks represent diverse 
communities from within academia, policy circles, and the military professions.  The 
frameworks put forward vary considerably in terms of focus, subject, and depth of 
analysis.26 
Perhaps Bard O’Neill of the National Defense University originally put the most 
influential of these models forward in 1990.  His structured analysis provided an effective 
means to not only analyze insurgent movements but to compare and contrast the multiple 
nuances inherent in such a complex endeavor which defies facile generalizations.27  
Professor Jack Goldstone devised an alternative framework for analysis, one that O’Neill 
references as required reading for anyone desiring a basic understanding of revolutionary 
warfare.  Goldstone contends that understanding insurgencies depends on the conjuncture 
of three conditions: “declining state resources relative to expenses and the resources of 
adversaries, increasing elite alienation and disunity, and growing popular grievances and 
autonomy.”28   
A commonality among most of these models is their focus on the popular 
sympathies, conditions, and environments that evoke rebellion and cause them to grow—                                                 
25 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970), v. 
26 An additional framework that may be of interest to airpower theorists was put forward by two Army 
officers who retooled Col John Warden’s classic five-ring model specifically to deal with 
counterinsurgency operations.  See Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, “Is there a Deep Fight in 
Counterinsurgency” Military Review (July-August 2005) at 
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/grubbs.pdf. 
27 O’Neill’s framework for analysis includes: the insurgent strategy, the operating environment, 
popular support, organization and unity, and external support.  The concepts of strategy and environment 
are instrumental in delineating cases of insurgent movements and are utilized in the case studies contained 
in Chapters III through V.   See Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse 
(New York: Potomac Books, 2005).   
28 Jack A. Goldstone, “An Analytical Framework” in Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, eds. 
Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri  (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991), 49. 
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in economic terms, they emphasize the demand side of the problem.  While important for 
understanding such movements and analyzing political courses of action in a small war, 
the demand side of the problem has limited utility to determine the effective use of 
airpower.  An alternative model that emphasizes the supply side of the problem would 
better highlight the production process of such movements, thus providing more 
definitive analysis regarding the effectiveness of airpower as a means to counter the 
production.  Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. offer such a framework. 
B. THE LEITES AND WOLF FRAMEWORK 
In 1970 researchers Leites and Wolf of the RAND Corporation published 
Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, which aimed to 
provide general theories regarding the concept of insurgency and counterinsurgency.  The 
most enlightening of these theories was the development of a model to depict an 
insurgent movement as a system (see fig.).  Although specifically dealing with 
insurgencies, this system model also works for small wars as defined in Chapter I.  
Indeed, the protracted and combined sociopolitical-military nature of insurgencies 
represents the version of small wars most vexing to airpower.29  This model also provides 
a strategy to defeat insurgencies based on their implicit vulnerabilities. Leites and Wolf 
derive four primary methods of counterinsurgency.  Before analyzing them, however, one 
must understand the system model itself. 
                                                 
29 Airpower has supported both sides of the insurgency coin. Examples of airpower support to 
insurgents include the insertion and resupply of the Jedburg teams from the World War II Office of 
Strategic Services in occupied France; the 1045th Observation, Training, and Evaluation Group’s covert 
missions into Tibet for insertion and resupply of guerrillas trained by the Central Intelligence Agency; and 
the support rendered by Operation 32, Air Studies Branch to Military Assistance Command Vietnam 
Studies and Observations Group’s long-range infiltration of agents and propaganda operations during the 
Vietnam War. Larry E. Cable accurately recounts the need of external support, such as air support: “The 
American guerrilla was all too much like the astronaut, who, whether in his capsule or walking in his moon 
suit, was dependent completely upon a complicated life support system for viability.” Conflict of Myths: 
The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York 
University Press, 1986), 147. 
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Figure 1.   Leites and Wolf’s insurgency as a system. (Reprinted from Nathan Leites and 
Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970], 35.) 
 
To attain overall effectiveness, insurgent movements “require that certain 
inputs—obtained from either internal or external sources—be converted into certain 
outputs, or activities.”30  These inputs most often come from the internal (endogenous) 
environment, examples of which include raw recruits from the population and foodstuffs. 
External (exogenous) inputs can range from financing to weapons and publicity. 
Insurgents obtain these inputs by using a combination of persuasive and coercive 
measures. 
The raw inputs then enter a conversion mechanism that entails production 
functions such as training, equipping, and supplying the insurgency.  The effectiveness of 
the system oftentimes depends on the degree of organization at this level.  Developed 
                                                 
30 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority,  32. 
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systems may have individual branches dedicated to “personnel, financial, and logistic 
matters, as well as intelligence, communications, and operations.”31  Ultimately, the 
conversion mechanism produces the outputs of the system. 
Outputs from nonregular forces may be as familiar as sabotage, terrorist activities, 
public demonstrations, and small-scale military attacks.  Less obvious outputs include 
administrative and governmental jurisdiction functions such as village-aid projects, 
education, training, and formation of other organizational programs.32  Importantly, the 
Leites and Wolf framework reveals four methods to counter the advance of the insurgent 
system.  It is possible to influence each of these methods, to some degree, by the use of 
airpower. 
C. COUNTERS BASED ON THE LEITES AND WOLF FRAMEWORK 
The first method reduces available resources by controlling the amount and cost 
of acquiring both exogenous and endogenous inputs.  Controlling this logistical aspect 
ostensibly should reside with police or ground forces, but the interdiction capability of 
airpower may prove appropriate for input denial.   
The second reduces the efficiency of the production processes.  Training camps 
for regular or nonregular forces—traditional static targets—obviously represent a 
potential target for airpower.  Many other targets in small wars, however, are not suitable 
for “attack” via conventional weapons and crosshairs.  Examples of nonlethal production 
denial operations include psychological operations (PSYOPS), defoliation, and harassing 
fires. 
The traditional counterforce role of military action, Leites and Wolf’s third 
method of countering the system, targets opposing forces directly.  “This is the traditional 
military task; it is best understood, most familiar, and most typically preferred by the 
military.”33  As such, it is the method most seemingly apropos for airpower.  Again, 
however, it does not necessarily require tritonal or depleted uranium.  Instead, indirect  
 
                                                 
31 David Willard Parsons, “Towards the Proper Application of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993), 63. 
32 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 34. 
33 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 81. 
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means of reducing nonregular forces will likely become more important in small wars 
than in larger ones.34  Indirect counterforce means such as surveillance, reconnaissance, 
and intelligence fall into such a category. 
Finally, Leites and Wolf’s fourth method involves increasing the capacity to 
absorb the actions of opposing forces.  This includes passive measures such as population 
evacuation and relocation as well as active defense measures.  Perhaps even more than in 
the direct counterforce role, airpower can prove most beneficial in the active defense role.  
Leites and Wolf explain: 
This active defensive role may be enhanced, in addition, through aerial 
patrols that maintain round-the-clock surveillance and can apply a heavy 
concentration of ready firepower in the event of a guerrilla attack. Small 
aircraft with long loiter times and enough weaponry to counter a light or 
moderately heavy guerrilla attack effectively may be an important 
component in this type of active defense system. The main purpose of 
such an aerial police would be to provide both the symbol and the reality 
of [the authority’s] presence and protection.35 
The Leites and Wolf model of insurgency provides a general framework for 
understanding the nature of small wars.  The system presented here forms the “engine” 
that drives production of the organization’s outputs.   
Leites and Wolf’s primary aim was “generalization and theory—to develop and 
illustrate a way of analyzing insurgent conflicts—rather than application of the analytical 
method to actual conflicts.”36  The following three chapters attempt to do just that.  They 
will apply the analytical method within the context of historical examples of small wars 
in which airpower played an important, albeit oftentimes supporting, role in the overall 
success of the campaign. 
                                                 
34 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 82 
35 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 83. 
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III. SMALL WARS OF THE BRITISH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the one country to most often utilize airpower in a small war environment 
is Great Britain.  Air control as a means of coercive power was utilized extensively by the 
British during the period between the world wars as an expedient and low cost means to 
control the vast British colonial empire.37  The British dealt with colonial disorders as a 
military issue, with little regard for the social, economic, or political aspirations of the 
indigenous colonial populations.38 
These colonial requirements did not decrease following World War II even as the 
strength of the British military decreased significantly.39  What did change was the 
realization of the validity of air control doctrine and the preeminence of airpower in small 
wars.  As one Royal Air Force (RAF) group captain in 1946 contended, “Since the 
essence of occupation is the presence of troops in the territory, it is probable that the 
greatest contribution which the air force can make is to carry the Army around the 
country.”40  Thus, following six brutal years of global war, the RAF, despite drastic 
reductions of men and equipment, suddenly had to adapt to a completely different form 
of warfare.  The RAF’s first encounter with this new era of small wars was in the dense 
jungles of the Malay Peninsula.  
 
 
                                                 
37 Much of the air control doctrine utilized by the British evolved from early results obtained by the 
use of aircraft to quell uprisings in British Somaliland in 1919-1920.  In the wake of World War I the 
British faced imperial obligations such as League of Nations mandates to control colonial locales.  At the 
same time the Royal Air Force (RAF), a newly-minted separate service, was fighting for institutional 
existence. Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, RAF chief of staff, desired a mission that would justify the 
independence of the RAF.  Trenchard proposed that the RAF take the lead in conducting military 
operations in Britain’s most troublesome new mandate—the former Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia.  
See James S. Corum, “The Myth of Air Control,” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 4 (Winter 2000). 
38 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 180. 
39 By the start of the Malayan Emergency, the number of RAF personnel had plummeted from a 
World War II level of 125,000 in Air Command Southeast Asia to fewer than 9,000 in all of Air Command 
Far East.  There were similarly dramatic reductions in hardware: from over 1,300 aircraft down to around 
100.  See Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 179.   
40 Group Captain G.G. Barnett, “The Role of the Royal Air Force in the Preservation of Peace,” RUSI 
(February-November 1946), 77. 
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B. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 
1. Background 
Great Britain waged the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 in response to an 
uprising by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).  After initial setbacks, the British 
implemented a vast array of civil and military programs tied together in an overall 
strategic plan.  Critical to success was the Briggs Plan—a massive undertaking to 
separate the MCP guerrillas from the population by the resettlement of 400-500,000 
Chinese squatters into “new villages.”41  Despite strong advances early in their effort, the 
MCP lost the momentum under the pressure of the Briggs Plan and never regained it.   
The British experience in Malaya stands as a modern example of a successful 
counterinsurgency effort in a small war.  This is certainly not to say the British solution is 
the singular answer to addressing the complex milieu that makes up counterinsurgencies 
in small wars.  It does, however, provide a distinctive insight into the possible 
imaginative uses of a small but flexible air component to support the larger political-
military effort.42 
2. Environment 
The Malay Peninsula spanned over 50,000 square miles—roughly the size of the 
state of Florida.  Two-thirds of this territory was engulfed by triple canopy jungle.  The 
Royal Air Force (RAF) operated from six major airfields with only one suitable for 
supporting medium bombers.  The RAF aircraft represented a mix of World War II-
vintage propeller driven aircraft such as Spitfires and Lincoln bombers, modern jet 
aircraft such as de Havilland Vampires and Canberra jet bombers, rotary wing aircraft, 
and light and medium transport aircraft.  Despite the vast array of types, there were never 
more than fifteen RAF squadrons in Malaya at one time.43 
Demographically, approximately 4.9 million people lived in Malaya.  Of these, 
only 2.1 million people were Malays.  Ethnic Chinese comprised 1.9 million people and 
just over 500,000 were of Indian descent.44  Perhaps the most salient divide of the time 
                                                 
41 R. W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1972), 19. 
42 Komer, The Malayan Emergency, 52. 
43 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 193. 
44 Brozenick, Small Wars, 74. 
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was ethnic.  As author Larry Cable suggests, the insurgency was “confined to the Chinese 
residents of Malaya, a minority of the population which was easily separated from the 
ethnic Malays who constituted the majority.”45 
3. Opposition Strategy  
The opposition in the Malayan Emergency employed a classic Maoist insurgent 
strategy in its bid to overthrow government forces.  The desired end state was the 
installation of a Marxist regime.  This strategy was to be executed in three phases.  
During the pre-hostilities phase, the MCP attempted to develop a cadre and infrastructure 
primarily through political confrontation.  The second or guerrilla warfare phase aimed 
to extend political control throughout the countryside to strangle the economy and link 
liberated rural areas.  Finally, victory was to come from a conventional warfare phase.46 
4. Popular and External Support 
A distinguishing aspect of the Malayan Emergency was that not a single external 
actor provided any substantial support to the MPC.  The Chinese Red Army was waging 
a revolutionary war against the Kuomintang forces, and the Soviet Union was 
strengthening its grip on Eastern Europe.  Malaya itself and its people were the only 
sources of support for the MPC.  Thus, the once-partisan movement was now forced to 
operate as an insurgent organization.47  Popular support for logistics, personnel, and 
intelligence was primarily derived from Chinese squatters living near the jungle fringe. 
5. Framework for Analysis 
a.   Input Denial 
Many factors within the Malayan Emergency reduced the ability of the 
RAF to conduct Leites and Wolf’s first method of limiting insurgent progress: input-
denial.  Adverse weather, terrain, and the dense foliage of the Malay Peninsula limited 
the effectiveness of airpower in the classic interdiction role.  The most limiting factor for 
interdiction, however, was the fleeting nature of the MCP guerrillas, if they could be 
found at all.  Perhaps the most vivid example of this comes from the futile attempts to 
interdict the Tens Fook Loong and Number 3 Independent Platoon.  Despite accurate 
                                                 
45 Larry Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the 
Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 71. 
46 Brozenick, Small Wars, 91. 
47 Cable, Conflict of Myths, 73; Brozenick, Small Wars, 92. 
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intelligence of the enemy’s location, the RAF dropped over 709,000 pounds of ordnance 
over the course of multiple missions in 1956.  The end result was only four enemy 
casualties.48 
b.   Countering the Production Process 
Attacking the production process, Leites and Wolf’s second method, was 
more effective than interdiction.  Airpower’s chief contribution in this regard was 
defoliation during the massive food denial campaign of the Briggs Plan.  Even without 
actively aerial spraying, airpower contributed to the food denial efforts by observing 
clearings in the jungle that were tell-tale signs of guerrilla cultivation sites. 
Psychological operations, another counter to the production process, was 
“one of the most useful weapons” employed during the Emergency and included 
leafleting as well as voice recordings broadcast from airplanes.49  Upwards of 70 percent 
of surrendering MCP guerrillas claimed that these “voice flights” had some role in 
shaping their decision.50 
A tertiary success in affecting the production process was generated 
through what essentially amounted to harassing fires.  These harassing fires, however, 
came at the expense of the traditional counterforce method of airpower, Leites and 
Wolf’s third component.  The evidence suggests that “air strikes were responsible for less 
than 10 percent of all enemy dead. . . . But air attacks did keep the enemy moving and 
unsettled and increased the number of successful contacts with ground forces.”  General 
Briggs stated that “offensive air support plays a very vital role in the main object of the 
Security Forces, namely the destruction of bandit morale and the increasing of the morale 
of the civil population.”51 
c.   Counterforce 
While the direct means of counterforce operations through airpower met 
with limited success in Malaya, counterforce through indirect means proved critical.                                                   
48 Jay Gordon Simpson, “Not by Bombs Alone: Lessons from Malaya,” Joint Forces Quarterly 
(Summer 1999), 95. 
49 Between 1955 and 1957, approximately 50,000 leaflets were delivered for every insurgent in the 
field.  See Malcolm Postgate, Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 
(London: Ministry of Defense Air Historical Branch (RAF), 1992), 152.  
50 Komer, The Malayan Emergency, 75. 
51 Komer, The Malayan Emergency, 95. 
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Aerial reconnaissance also was effective, finding “155 confirmed and 77 possible 
guerrilla camps as well as 313 cultivated sites, 31 recultivations, 194 clearings of 
probably terrorist origin, and 21 [friendly] farms under enemy control over a six-month 
period in 1955.”52  Reconnaissance missions flown by the RAF also critically aided 
British ground forces.  Early air and ground operations were hobbled by inaccurate or an 
absolute lack of maps of Malaya.  RAF aerial reconnaissance missions rectified this 
problem by photographing the entire peninsula.53    
d.   Active Defense 
The fourth and final method of countering insurgents involved active 
defense measures.  Leites and Wolf’s idea of “extending the presence and protection” of 
an aerial police was arguably airpower’s most instrumental offering in Malaya.  Dr. 
James S. Corum and Col. Wray R.  Johnson explain that “by extending the presence and 
protection of the government to remote areas, the military quickly made the Malayan 
countryside an inhospitable place for the [enemy].  It was in support of this effort, rather 
than by direct offensive action, that the RAF proved invaluable.”54  The aerial police 
force in Malaya manifested itself not only in Leites and Wolf’s vision of a small attack 
plane, but in the ubiquitous tactical light and medium cargo aircraft of the air transport 
units.  With supporting roles played by aircraft involved in transport, supply drops, 
medical evacuations, and even command and control, air supply proved indispensable.55 
Airpower played a vital but supporting role in the overall success of the 
British in the Malayan Emergency.  Key to this success was the imaginative and often 
times unorthodox operational and tactical application of airpower to support the political 
and military aims of the overall strategy.  Thus, “the order of importance of RAF 
operations overall was generally assessed to be air supply and transport, 
photoreconnaissance, close air support, long-range strikes against targets beyond the 
reach of units on the ground, and communications.”56  While airpower played a 
supporting effort during Malaya, it was to prove vital in a future British small war. 
                                                 
52 Simpon, “Not by Bombs Alone,” 97. 
53 Brozenick, Small Wars, 111. 
54 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 191. 
55 Komer, The Malayan Emergency, 52. 
56 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 195. 
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C. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 
1. Background 
Twenty-two years after the end of the Malayan Emergency, the British found 
themselves fighting yet another small war.  This time the British military was pitted 
against conventional armed forces—the regular Argentine army, navy, and air force in a 
battle for the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic.  As one historian described the 
conflict, “The struggle for the Falklands was essentially a small colonial war midway in 
kind between a counter-insurgency [sic] operation and the amoured warfare seen in 
Europe in 1944-45.”57 
On 2 April 1982, in an act of unprovoked aggression against British sovereign 
territory and British citizens, Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands.58  The 
British declared a 200-mile naval blockade around the Falkland Islands.  Within days the 
military machines of both countries were literally on a collision course at a rate of 18 
knots as the British fleet steamed southward.59  The staunch nationalism of each side and 
the resulting lack of compromise turned out to be the major reason for the failure of 
diplomatic efforts.  These national positions were a result of the political and social 
unrest in Argentina and of the political and social principles of Great Britain. 
2. Environment 
Another element that strengthened the justification for confrontation was the 
limited territorial scope of the crisis.  The Falkland Islands, known as Islas Malvinas in 
Argentina, comprise a small archipelago situated 300 miles east of the Strait of Magellan.  
With a population of less than 3,000 people, the Falkland Islands are mostly wind-swept 
grasslands approximately the size of Connecticut.  This small footprint contained the 
confrontation and afforded a low risk for expansion with limited impact on non-
combatants.  As one historian indicates: 
The very simplicity of the issue created its own difficulties, for it was not 
possible to draw on a range of interlocking issues to produce a series of 
                                                 
57 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1983), 316. 
58 Duncan Anderson, Essential Histories: The Falklands War 1982 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 
2002), 5. 
59 A. M. Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York:  Macmillan Publishing 
Company), 265. 
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complex trade-offs.  Basic principles of sovereignty and self-
determination were at stake and these do not leave a lot of room for 
compromise, especially with the addition of prestige.60 
3. Opposition Strategy 
Argentinean forces employed what Bard O’Neill refers to as the military-focus 
strategy “it gives primacy to military action and subordinates political action” and, fully 
aware of the value of popular support, the opposition makes “no systematic, sustained 
effort to acquire it through extensive political organizing efforts . . . instead, proponents 
of the military focus believe that popular support either is already sufficient or will be a 
by-product of military victories.”61   
To counter this military-focus strategy, the British utilized an almost wholly-
conventional response.  The RAF and Royal Navy deployed 14 Harrier GR3s and 28 Sea 
Harriers, respectively.  These aircraft eventually tallied a combined total of 1561 combat 
sorties. Aging Vulcan bombers flew five attack sorties.  These missions were supported 
by 375 Victor Tanker, 111 Nimrod and more than 600 Hercules and VC10 sorties.62 
Additionally, almost 200 helicopters of seven different types flew countless missions, 
ranging from strategic lift to reconnaissance, often while flying at over three times the 
peacetime schedule.63 
4. Popular and External Support 
The unrest that inspired the Junta to galvanize support was a consequence of its 
loss of power since seizing control of the country in 1976.  The Argentinean economy 
had decayed amidst mounting unemployment and inflation which rose at an annual rate 
of 150 percent.64  Economic pressures combined with increasingly unpopular acts of 
repression, murder, and torture reached a climax in early 1982.  The Junta used the 
                                                 
60 L. Freedman, L and V. Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (New 
Jersey: Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1991), 239-240. 
61 O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 56. 
62 Martin Spirit and James Paul, “The Air War.” Britain’s Small Wars, 2002, http://www.britains-
smallwars.com/Falklands/air-war.htm (accessed November 2005), 2. 
63 The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1983), 20. 
64 K. Watman and D. Wilkening, U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 
1995), 38. 
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seizing of “the Falklands as a means of reasserting its legitimacy through demonstration 
of military competence.”65 
A domestic impetus to the invasion was not limited to the Junta.  British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher faced her own internal discord prior to the Falkland situation.  
In the post World War II era Great Britain’s once dominant empire began to decline.  The 
aggressive behavior of Argentina rekindled a sense of nationalism within Great Britain.66  
This nationalism, however, had little to do with colonial desires.  Indeed, Britain was 
willing to decolonize the Falklands.  She was, however, not willing to simply hand them 
over for recolonization under the Argentinean flag.67 
Thus, the groundwork for a politically motivated but territorially-based and 
confined small war was established, one that has to be considered unique based on the 
conventional disposition of the belligerents and the relative high importance of 
airpower.68   
5. Framework for Analysis 
a.   Input Denial 
Similar to Malaya, many factors contributed to the British inability to 
conduct Leites and Wolf’s first method for decreasing the opposition’s advance: input-
denial.  Instead of adverse weather and terrain, the sheer distance to the combatant area 
was the limiting factor.  “Of all the factors disturbing British commanders throughout the 
war, it was the awesome distance between the theater of operation and the home base that 
remained the most potent.  Any form of disaster—damaged ships, stranded men, lost 
aircraft—would take place more than 3,000 miles from any secure source of support.”69  
On 30 April-1 May, 1982, however, one Vulcan bomber from 101 Squadron, Strike 
                                                 
65 Watman, U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies, 39. 
66 T. Glaser, “The Falklands: Failure of a Mission.” Conflict Research Consortium. 1998,  
http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/wynd7306.htm (accessed October  2005). 
67 Haig, Caveat, 268. 
68 Martin Van Creveld refers to the Falklands War as a conventional war.  He defines conventional 
wars as “armed conflicts openly waged by one state against another by means of their regular armies.”  He 
does later refer to the limiting aspects that define small wars: the war “was waged in such a remote region, 
and over such an unimportant issue, as to make many people wonder why it had to be conducted at all.”  
See Martin Van Creveld, “Modern Conventional Warfare: An Overview” 2000, 
http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2004_05_25_papers/modern_warfare.doc (accessed June 
2005). 
69 Hastings, The Battle for the Falklands, 119. 
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Command, flew the first of five “Black Buck” raids against Argentinean forces.  The 
bomber dropped twenty-one 1,000 pound bombs on the runway of Port Stanley during a 
15 hour and 45 minute sortie in which the bomber was refueled 17 times.70  While never 
being totally confident of closing the runway, the RAF thought it could render the 
runway unserviceable for high performance jets.71  More importantly, these attacks had a 
“significant effect of causing the Argentine government to hold its only radar-equipped 
fighters on homeland alert in case of heavy British bomber strikes against the 
mainland.”72  Additional static targets such as the airfield on Pebble Island and fixed 
Argentine troop installations also provided a few, albeit limited, limited interdiction 
targets for British airpower.  
b.   Countering the Production Process 
Attacking the production process, Leites and Wolf’s second method, was 
certainly less effective compared to basic interdiction, which is not to say that harassing 
fires from airpower did not have some tangential effects.  As one Argentinean conscript 
recounted, “They [British forces] would bomb us every night.  They would start working 
their way down, and when they reached the end of our sector they would go back to the 
front and start again.  The whole world would seem to be coming on top of you.  There 
was a feeling of impotence, as if you were just waiting for death.”73  While short duration 
attacks from bombs and shells normally shake a soldier from lassitude, the sustained 
harassment of the fixed Argentine front-line conscript tended instead to reinforce this 
characteristic.74 
c.   Counterforce 
The third area of analysis, counterforce operations, was paramount during 
the Falklands Island Campaign.  Counterforce operations were especially critical in the 
air.  From the start, the British established three air patrol positions: one north of the 
                                                 
70 The Black Buck attacks marked the first and only time Vulcan bombers dropped ordnance in 
combat.  The Vulcans were retired from the RAF immediately afterwards.  Anderson, Essential Histories, 
32.   
71 Anderson, Essential Histories, 32. 
72 Christopher J. Bowie, Coping with the Unexpected: Great Britain and the War in the South Atlantic.  
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islands; a second over West Falkland; a third over the southern end of Falkland Sound.75  
From these vantage points, British Sea Harriers downed 18 Argentinean fighters.   
Unlike Malaya, however, the indirect means of counterforce operations 
were negligible.  Psychological operations and aerial reconnaissance were limited by the 
extreme distances covered by the British forces and the lack of equipment available in the 
South Atlantic.  Also, the British military after action analysis of the Campaign 
determined that based on the short duration of the conflict the “absence of a dedicated 
overland air reconnaissance capability was a handicap in the Campaign, and the resulting 
lack of precise information on enemy dispositions presented an additional hazard to 
ground forces.”76 
d.   Active Defense 
Again, the fourth and final method of countering the system involves 
active defense via airpower.  Leites and Wolf’s idea of a “small aircraft with long loiter 
times and enough weaponry to counter a light or moderately heavy” attack played a 
major role in the Falklands.  The Sea Harrier typified the aerial police force in Falklands 
by providing “presence and protection” for the British forces.  Researcher Max Hastings 
contends that beyond the actual number of enemy aircraft they shot down, the “Harriers 
made an enormous contribution by breaking up and turning back enemy attacks before 
they had been pressed home.”77  Additionally, transport, supply drops, and air supply 
proved vital to the British involvement.   
D.   ANALYSIS 
Thus, in contrast to what was seen in the Malayan Emergency, airpower proved to 
be key to British success during the Falklands Campaign.  The critical roles of airpower, 
as can be expected, were almost the inverse of those in Malaya.  In terms of importance 
to the overall operation, these roles were: air defense, air supply and transport, close air 
support, long-range strikes, reconnaissance, and communication.  Cleary then, these two  
diverse cases represent the far ends of the small war continuum.  By analyzing them, the 
primary lessons for airpower in small wars can be established.   
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IV. SMALL WARS OF THE FRENCH 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
While Great Britain was struggling with the insurgency in Malaya, French armed 
forces were fighting small wars in Indochina and Algeria.  In both these cases, the 
opposition forces proved to be larger and more powerful than the insurgency encountered 
by the British.  Additionally, the French forces in both Indochina and Algeria faced 
opponents who were ethnically similar to the indigenous populations, and who enjoyed 
the sanctuary and security of an exogenous supporting nation with a shared border.   
Not surprisingly, French air power played a much different role in these conflicts 
than British airpower in Malaya and the Falklands.   Despite difficulties finding and 
identifying guerrillas in the jungles of Indochina, French airpower—both combat and 
logistical—often proved the salvation of isolated ground forces.  In the vast reaches of 
Algeria, aerial and airmobile forces were often the most effective means of rapidly 
hunting down and breaking up guerrilla groups.78   Finally, while the British proved 
victorious in Malaya and later the Falklands as well, the insurgent forces defeated the 
French in both Indochina and Algeria.   
B.   THE FIRST INDOCHINA WAR (1946-1954) 
1. Background 
France waged The First Indochina War from 1946 through 1954 in an attempt to 
regain control of colonial possessions in Southeast Asia that were partially lost during 
World War II.  Japanese forces occupied what is modern-day Vietnam beginning in 
September 1940.  This territory, along with the present-day countries of Cambodia and 
Laos, comprised Indochina which was a French colony since the second half of the 
nineteenth century.79  During the Japanese occupation Ho Chi Minh formed the 
Vietnamese Communist Party and established national elements to oppose the Japanese 
forces.  These elements eventually became known as the Viet Minh.   
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Following World War II, the French returned to Indochina and reestablished pro-
French monarchies in Cambodia and Laos and attempted to reestablish a similar 
monarchy in Vietnam that would rule under a French protectorate.  Ho Chi Minh traveled 
to Paris to negotiate a diplomatic solution, but the situation deteriorated rapidly and by 
November 1946 severe fighting broke out between French forces and the Viet Minh.80   
2. Environment 
French Indochina consisted of a land mass that spanned around 285,000 square 
miles.  Half of this territory was dense jungle.   Only 20 percent of the area, mostly deltas 
and open plains, was void of vegetation.  Indochina sweltered under a hot monsoon 
climate, with torrential rains lasting from the end of May until the beginning of October.  
Mountains reaching above ten thousand feet in places formed a topographic division 
through the middle of Indochina.  These same mountains today form the border that 
modern-day Vietnam shares with Laos and Cambodia.  
Demographically, the region contained 30 million people with half of them living 
in what was later called North Vietnam, the location of most of the fighting against the 
French.  Of these inhabitants, 29 million were confined to only 20 percent of the land.  
More importantly, the inhabitants were essentially ethnically and culturally homogenous.  
Minority ethnic groups comprised only 15 percent of the total population and were 
mostly Chinese and Cambodians, along with several “hill tribes.”81 
3. Opposition Strategy  
As the war in Indochina unfolded, the French controlled major cities and their 
enclaves while the Viet Minh controlled the countryside.82  Initial attacks by the Viet 
Minh were often on a larger scale than typical guerrilla engagements.  As former director 
of U.S. intelligence, William Bundy, stated in an official memorandum, “The Viet Minh 
had developed elaborate logistic lines and extensive supplies which permitted them to 
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conduct protracted large-scale attack operations even though their tactical concepts 
remained oriented basically toward guerrilla rather than conventional or positional 
warfare.”83 
General Vo Nguyen Giap, the military commander of the Viet Minh, escalated his 
forces from guerrilla to offensive operations in 1950.  After initial victories over French 
frontier outposts, Giap suffered a tremendous defeat when he attacked the city of Vinh-
Yen.84  Following this unsuccessful offensive, Giap returned to protracted guerrilla 
attacks and attrition warfare.     
Based on these victories, the French Commander-in-Chief in Indochina believed 
that the war could be won by decisive set-piece battles of attrition.  This belief became 
known as the “illusion of Vinh-Yen.”  Further victories at Na-San airfield in 1953 
furthered this notion of big-battles supplied, reinforced, and supported by air transport 
alone.  Unfortunately, these misunderstandings directly led to the final defeat of the 
French in Indochina at the battle for Dien Bien Phu.85  
4. Popular and External Support 
The Viet Minh enjoyed an increasing allegiance from many of the Vietnamese 
people, especially those in the Tonkin region.  Many went beyond tacit support and 
formed regional and local guerrilla units inside the French enclaves.  These guerrilla 
forces constantly raided French outposts and tied down considerable numbers of forces in 
fortifications and rear security.   
The Viet Minh lacked external support entirely during this initial guerrilla phase.  
This, however, changed dramatically on October 1, 1949, when Chinese Communist 
Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung claimed a victory over the Kuomintang and instated the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC).  Within days the United States Congress passed the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Program to finance the efforts of non-communist countries 
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such as France.  The American commitment to the French-Indochina war followed 
almost immediately.86  The Viet Minh also enjoyed a sanctuary across the border in 
southern China.  PRC forces also helped train the Viet Minh from within this sanctuary.  
Perhaps most significant for General Giap and his forces was the inundation of artillery 
and anti-aircraft weapons.  The latter would have a dramatic impact on reducing the 
effectiveness of French airpower. 87   
5. Framework for Analysis 
Before analyzing the impact of French airpower on the Indochina War it is 
necessary to place it in its proper context.  Bernard Fall, famed author of Street Without 
Joy, a classic study of the First Indochina War, explains: 
If much of the Indochina war was fought on a thin shoestring, the air war 
was fought on one that was also badly frayed and had to be held together 
by knots at several places.  In 1946, the French Expeditionary Corps 
fielded sixty British Spitfires whose wood and canvas components literally 
rotted off the aircraft in mid-flight. . . . The backbone of the transport and 
bomber force was made up of German Junkers-52 tri-motor planes 
assembled from booty stocks found in Germany.  In many cases the same 
planes fulfilled transport and bombing missions, with the “bombardiers” 
simply lobbing bombs and napalm canisters out of the plane’s side 
doors.88  
French aircraft from both the navy and air force continued to improve and 
eventually included American-made aircraft.  The French also operated at least one 
aircraft carrier in the Gulf of Tonkin for the duration of the war.89 
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a.   Input-Denial 
A deficit of the “shoestring” air war was the inability to wage an input-
denial campaign.  This was exacerbated by shortfalls of aircraft and intelligence.  A 
prime example of this is that the French navy possessed the only aircraft in Indochina 
with long-range bombardment capability and these amounted to only six aging 
bombers.90  In contrast, Viet Minh inputs flourished.  Leading up to Dien Bien Phu, 
supply lines consisted of 300,000 soldiers and peasants moving artillery, anti-aircraft 
guns, and other materiel along a 500-mile trek.91  General Vo Nguyen Giap himself best 
describes such an impossible interdiction target: 
At night, the cloud-covered mountains and forests of the northwest 
became a hive of activity.  Trucks hauling artillery plus transport vehicles 
rolled by in long motorized convoys.  The convoys of human beings 
seemed endless. . . The bicycle convoys looked like a herd of little 
elephants. . . The highlanders, dressed in their colorful costumes, carried 
baskets of rice on their backs or led pack-animals along.  A logistics 
officer was even escorting a herd of pigs.  All were moving in one 
direction.92  
Another input-denial method utilized by the French that depended on 
airpower was the robust employment of airborne forces.  As one of their primary lessons 
learned, the French realized that the war “emphasized the importance of strategic 
mobility based upon air transport in areas devoid of land communications; it also proved 
that tactical mobility was just as necessary without making this requirement synonymous 
with motorization.”93  Unfortunately, a shortage of airlift, especially tactical airlift, often 
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imposed a severe limit on the material these airborne forces could carry.94  These same 
shortages also had a significant impact on Leites and Wolf’s second method, countering 
the production process. 
b.   Countering the Production Process 
Instead of ranging out and disrupting the production process of the Viet 
Minh, the French spent a sizeable effort securing their own positions.95  By the end of the 
war, over 80,000 troops were held immobilized behind the security of the wire of 920 
outposts and forts.  Half of all French infantry were used for guard duties.96  As author 
Bard O’Neill describes, “The French in Indochina mistakenly tried to defend all lines of 
communication and, thus, ended up with a large, static defense force.”97  The significant 
effort of airpower resources needed to supply and help protect these static forts came at 
the expense of affecting the enemy hidden in the jungle. 
Perhaps the most successful method employed to undermine the Viet 
Minh’s sense of security was the use of French-led guerrilla forces.  By 1953 between 
fifteen and twenty thousand indigenous forces were fighting against the Viet Minh in the 
Tongking region.  At one point, these French-led guerrillas had tied up fourteen Viet 
Minh battalions.  Airpower played a significant role in this effort: the whole operation 
was supported by air to include three hundred tons of supplies airlifted each month.98 
c.   Counterforce  
French airpower also had mixed results on Leites and Wolf’s third 
method: counterforce operations.  The battles of Vinh-Yen and Na-San demonstrated the 
exceptional kinetic effectiveness of airpower given ideal circumstances.  Unfortunately, 
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the French commanders misconstrued the lessons following these battles and placed 
exaggerated faith in the killing effect of fire support from airpower.  As military historian 
Robert Scales contends, the French commanders then “sought to lure the Viet Minh into 
attacking well-prepared positions—to create a series of small Verduns intended to let the 
enemy ‘bleed himself white’ in the face of French firepower.” 99  Giap, however, also 
learned from these battles and returned to guerrilla tactics, seeking to lure the French 
further away from their bases and reducing the French firepower advantage. 
This return to guerrilla warfare also hurt the indirect counterforce 
operation of airpower.  One of the primary missions of L’Armée de l’air was aerial 
reconnaissance.  French air reconnaissance units, however, were singularly ineffective.  It 
was not until 1951 that the French air force had a formal reconnaissance unit in place.  
Even by the end of the war the French had not improved at spotting Viet Minh 
movements.100  One of the primary aircraft utilized for reconnaissance operations 
throughout the war was the light Morane Saulnier 500, essentially a French version of the 
German Feiseler “Storch” of World War II.  What the aircraft lacked as a jungle 
reconnaissance platform, it more than made up for in active defense. 
d.   Active Defense 
To meet the criteria of Leites and Wolf’s fourth method, reducing the 
opposition’s actions, we would expect to see a light aircraft representative of an aerial 
police force.   The Morane epitomized this description.  Indeed, ground units with a 
friendly Morane overhead were rarely ambushed and ground commanders with no 
assigned aviation often “tried to retain control over the Moranes by having them fly in 
circles overhead just in case something might happen.”101  One mission the Moranes 
were physically incapable of was heavy transport.   
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This is unfortunate as heavy transport aircraft were at a premium in 
Indochina and not just to support airborne operations and resupply French-led guerrilla 
operations.  Transport aircraft were to play the central role in a new strategy: establishing 
“air-land” fortresses that were to be supplied, reinforced, and supported by transports 
alone.  The groundwork was laid for the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu.  
e.   Airpower during Dien Bien Phu 
The seizing of Dien Bien Phu by the French was an attempt to repeat Na-
San on a grand scale.  Deep in Viet Minh territory, the small valley was 190 air miles 
from the primary French air bases in Hanoi.  On 10 March 1954 the Viet Minh began a 
siege of the French emplacement and within four days had closed the runway.  Air 
transports, now the vital link for the beleaguered French forces, were forced to air drop 
supplies.  Newly acquired Viet Minh antiaircraft pieces unleashed deadly fire that forced 
the transports to deliver their loads from eighty-five hundred feet, instead of the usual 
two thousand.102  Close air support fighters, operating at the limits of their range and 
hampered by heavy monsoon rains and difficult terrain, were unable to quiet the Viet 
Minh artillery raining down on French forces.   On 8 May, 55 days after the siege began, 
the surviving French troops surrendered to Giap and effectively ended French 
participation in the Indochina War. 
Much has been written regarding the fall of Dien Bien Phu.  As for the 
role of airpower during the siege as well as during the war, noone describes it more 
succinctly than the eminent Bernard Fall:  “When everything has been said about the 
many major and minor errors which led to the French debacle at Dien Bien Phu.  . . one 
single fact stands out above all others.  Air power on a more massive scale than was then 
available could not have changed the outcome of the Indochina War, but it would have 
saved Dien Bien Phu.”103   
                                                 
102 The aircraft losses at Dien Bien Phu were disproportionately large.  In addition to the aircraft 
destroyed on the ground, 48 were shot down over the valley, 14 were destroyed while landing on the 
runway, and 167 were damaged from enemy fire.  These are staggering numbers considering that there 
were only 450 aircraft in Indochina in 1954.  See Fall, Street Without Joy, 256-262. 
103 Fall, Hell in a very small place, 455.  An interesting aspect of the air war during Dien Bien Phu 
was the potential of American military involvement codenamed “Operation Vulture.”  The potential 
operation called for upwards of 60 B-29 bombers and 150 fighters from U.S. Seventh Fleet carriers to strike 
Viet Minh positions surrounding the valley.  There was even an escalatory option that included the use of 
three atomic weapons.  See Billings-Yun for an excellent description of the political aspects and the 
Eisenhower administration’s deliberations.  Also see Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, 293-326. 
33 
C.   ALGERIA 
1. Background 
A few short months after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the French were surprised by 
another outbreak of rebellious violence, this time in what was largely considered the 
crown jewel of colonial France: Algeria.   Algerian nationalists, known as the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN), sought nothing less than full independence.  French forces 
capitalized on their experience in Indochina and soon had divided Algeria into small 
sectors and blanketed the country with French forces in a defensive technique known as 
the quadrillage.  This measure was eventually supplemented by construction of strong 
barriers known as “barrages” along the Algerian borders with Tunisia and Morocco.104   
 Exposed to French aerial surveillance and attack by mobile forces, units of the 
Algerian Army of National Liberation (ALN) were broken up and their operations 
reduced to smaller-scaled terrorist attacks.  By 1959, French forces had essentially cut off 
ALN forces within Algeria and began successive massive offensives across the Algerian 
countryside.  By 1960, the ALN, reduced to as few as 9,000 men scattered into small 
groups, had been effectively destroyed as a military force.  However, unfortunately for 
the French the FLN eventually achieved on the political front what they were unable to 
achieve militarily: independence of Algeria from French rule.105 
2. Environment 
Algeria is a large and difficult arena for military operations.  Spanning roughly 
8.5 million square miles, the region in 1954 was four times the size of France with 90 
percent of the area comprised of desert.  Some four thousand miles of land borders were 
indeterminate and disputed with few recognizeable land marks.  Strikingly, Algeria was 
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compartmented into three major east-west zones by two chains of the Atlas Mountains.  
These zones also reflect differences in climatology ranging from a Mediterranean 
environment to the north to the harsh desert climate of the Sahara in the south.  
Temperatures and rainfall vary similarly with region, but precipitous changes in both are 
common.106   
Demographically, the population of Algeria in 1954 included nine million Arabs 
and around one million French settlers known in French as colons, and colloquially called 
pied noirs (black feet).107  The colons comprised most of the large landowners and the 
middle class of Algeria.  The Arab population, by contrast, was primarily engaged in 
agriculture and was the labor force.  Deep resentments lingered within the Arab 
population towards the seemingly well-off colons.   
3. Opposition Strategy  
Professor Bard O’Neill classifies the FLN strategy as an anticolonialist, national-
liberation secessionist movement.  Such groups seek to withdraw from the current 
political community and form their own nation-state.108  Generally, the FLN followed 
Mao’s strategy of protracted popular war even though they were Arab nationalists and 
Muslims rather than pure Marxists.  Aviation researcher Wray Johnson poignantly 
describes the ideology of the FLN as “a mixture of nationalism and Islamic 
fundamentalism with a bit of Marxism thrown in.”109 
4. Popular and External Support 
The FLN used the lingering political, social, and economic discrimination by the 
colons to fuel a widespread surge of nationalism directed at the colonial authorities.  Pro-
French Algerians that resisted the FLN were subsequently targeted for terrorist attacks.110   
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Other Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East spurred by pan-
Arabism and anticolonialism fervently supported the FLN.  Countries such as Egypt, 
Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco provided funds, arms and equipment, and external bases.  
The latter two countries, both sharing a border with Algeria, provided the most 
substantial support to the Algerian rebels and were thus a primary concern for French 
ground and air forces. 
5. Framework for Analysis 
When the war began, French airpower in Algeria was said to have been limited to 
eight aging transport aircraft and one helicopter.111   French forces rapidly increased in 
Algeria, swelling to 400,000 troops.  French air forces in Algeria grew similarly to a peak 
of over 35,000 personnel and nearly 700 fixed-wing aircraft.  Of considerable importance 
to airpower in Algeria was the imaginative and extensive use of the helicopter.   
By 1960, the French utilized over 400 helicopters ranging from light 
reconnaissance versions to heavy-lift transport aircraft.  The French also pioneered the 
first extensive operational use of helicopter gunships.  The introduction of these 
numerous helicopters and the development of organizations and tactics for their use was a 
resounding success, providing French force with a tactical and logistical mobility 
unmatched by the FLN.112  While some researchers dispute the overall success of 
helicopter operations in Algeria, the imaginative use of these assets was of critical 
importance in all areas of the Leites and Wolf model.113   
a.   Input-Denial 
Leites and Wolf’s input denial strategy seeks to effectively reduce the 
amount of resources available to a combatant by controlling both the supply and prices of 
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inputs.  Reducing the access to such inputs “requires the interdiction of external sources 
by border surveillance, barriers, or coercive measures applied directly against the external 
source of supply.”114  The FLN enjoyed two such external sources in the neighboring 
countries of Tunisia and Morocco.  These countries helped funnel men and materiel from 
other Arab nations while also providing a sanctuary for ALN training.   
France responded by capitalizing on Leites and Wolf’s suggestion of 
surveillance and barriers.  They erected elaborate defensive lines along the Moroccan and 
Tunisian borders.  The most famous of these was the Morice Line, a 320-kilometer long 
electrified fence and minefield studded by strongboxes containing French troops.  Ground 
surveillance was augmented by twenty-four hour visual and radar aerial surveillance over 
the barrage.  Helicopter-borne mobile units tracked and attacked any ALN units that 
managed to cross the barrage.   
This input-denial strategy, while expensive in terms of manpower and 
materiel, proved highly effective.   The barriers reduced “traffic by as much as 90 
percent, the French reached in North Africa the goal that eluded them—and their 
American successors—in Indochina.  Cutting off infiltrators bringing help from outside, 
they threw the ALN back on its own resources, and as the offensive against it stepped up, 
these grew ever more meager.”115   
b.   Counter Production Process 
While the barrages limited exogenous support, the quadrillage defensive 
technique proved to be vitally important at degrading the FLN’s endogenous capability.  
Unfortunately, these two techniques tied down 80,000 and 300,000 French troops, 
respectively, leaving little more than 15,000 men for intervention forces.116  Because of 
the manpower-intensive campaigns on the ground, French aviation thus served as a force-
multiplier and was a key tool for prosecuting wider psychological warfare.  Similar to the 
British in Malaya, the French utilized airpower for both loudspeaker operations and 
leaflet drops over isolated villages encouraging FLN members to surrender.   
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Perhaps the most significant impact of airpower in Algeria was sanctuary 
denial given the vast expanse of the Sahara desert available to the FLN.  As author Arthur 
Campbell describes: 
Open plains are obstacles to guerrillas because they have to concede 
mastery of the air to their opponents.  Before the onset of air power, 
Lawrence and his Arabs were able to retreat at will into the Arabian 
deserts, but the FLN [National Liberation Front] in Algeria, opposed by a 
powerful French air force, were denied access to the vast reaches of the 
Sahara.117  
Unfortunately, some operational techniques utilized by the French 
drastically hindered the counter-production process.  One draconian measure adopted by 
the French military that helped foster the production process of the FLN was “collective 
responsibility.”  Originally planned as a form of reprisals for offenses, the strategy 
inevitably led down a path of vicious escalation as the brutality of both sides escalated to 
include torture, rape, and mutilation.  The result of the measure often steeled the resolve 
of the FLN, further isolating the colons, and outraging French citizens when finally 
exposed.118    
c.   Counterforce  
Because of the barrages, the ALN had three options available to them:  to 
infiltrate small groups through the barrages hoping to avoid detection; to skirt the 
barrages to the south through the open desert, where even small convoys were vulnerable 
to aerial observation and attack by aircraft or helicopter-borne force; or to blast through 
the barriers in major combat operations involving large forces.  The ALN attempted all 
three without appreciable success, largely due to the direct counterforce application of 
airpower.119 
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Despite the successes of direct counterforce operations, the application of 
airpower in the indirect counterforce role proved to be even more effective.  Aerial 
reconnaissance and intelligence were instrumental to the French effort.  A few statistics 
bear this out.  In 1959, out of 144,000 missions flown by the French air force, 50,000 
were either visual or photographic reconnaissance.  There were over twice as many 
reconnaissance missions flown than those undertaken to provide supporting fire (24,200), 
the other key task of the air force.120  The results of these reconnaissance missions were 
dramatic and effective: army intelligence officers in the Atlas Mountains were in 
agreement that “75 per cent of intelligence in their possession came from air force 
sources.”121 
d. Active Defense 
The French utilized passive measures such as the quadrillage system and 
population relocation away from the barrage areas.  Airpower was primarily effective in 
the active defense role, largely while it was accomplishing other missions, such as aerial 
reconnaissance.  The French in Algeria met Leites and Wolf’s idea of a light aircraft with 
their U.S.-built WW II T-6 trainer.  Indeed, the T-6 proved to be the primary aircraft of 
the war: prior to 1960, some twenty-three squadrons were flying it.  The ubiquitous T-6 
played a central role in the war by its constant presence, thus providing an important 
psychological edge to the French.122 
FLN and ALN prisoners and defectors placed particular emphasis on the 
psychological impact made by the ever-present aircraft: 
The inhabitants of the douars (native villages) have become used to aerial 
reconnaissance. . . If a plane persists in flying around inhabited areas, they 
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to move on elsewhere.  The rebels fear observation craft greatly.  This 
obliges them to take a lot of precautions in their movements and in setting 
up camp.123 
D.   ANALYSIS 
The relative superiority of the French in Algeria, especially in terms of mobility 
and ability to interdict exogenous support, ensured that the painful military loss in 
Indochina was not repeated in Northern Africa.  Despite French technological superiority, 
the climate, terrain, and plentiful concealment provided by the jungle in Indochina greatly 
offset French airpower’s ability to locate and negatively affect the Viet Minh.  
Additionally, the French in Indochina lacked adequate numbers and types of aircraft to 
make a critical difference.   
The situation in Algeria was strikingly different.  The French were blessed with a 
physical environment that allowed them to use their technological superiority to 
advantage.  They also enjoyed a more extensive commitment of men and materiel to the 
war effort while being able to adversely impact the influx of resources through the 
quadrillage system and barrages, making both insurgents and their supply chains and 
extremely vulnerable to aerial observation and attack.   
Author Charles Shrader appropriately suggests that in Algeria, the French had the 
primary advantage of controlling the contested ground with a long-established and fully 
functioning political, administrative, military, and logistical system in place.  Shrader 
claims that “Even the most sacred of guerrilla logistical birthrights—a sea of friendly 
local supporters in which to swim—was for the Algerian rebel a pond polluted by pieds 
noirs” and Muslims loyal to France.124   
Nonetheless, the FLN eventually achieved politically what it could not achieve on 
the battlefield—independence from France.  The French involvement in both Indochina 
and Algeria exemplify the importance of the political aspect in the milieu of small wars.  
James Corum accurately describes this conundrum: “a determined people motivated by 
nationalism and armed with little more than patience and a willingness to die in large 
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numbers can win against a well-led and armed modern military force supported by the 
latest technology and plenty of airpower.”125  
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V. SMALL WARS OF THE UNITED STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Russell Weigley, in his seminal work The American Way of War, suggests that “in 
the history of American strategy, the direction taken by the American conception of war 
made most American strategists, through most of the time span of American history, 
strategists of annihilation.”126  Military correspondent Max Boot, however, contends that 
“this is only one way of American War.  There is another, less celebrated tradition in U.S. 
military history—a tradition of fighting small wars.”127  Other prominent historians agree 
with Boot, Colin Gray suggests that “The United States has a vast storehouse of firsthand 
historical experience that should educate its soldiers in the need to recognize that regular 
and irregular warfare are significantly different.”128 
Thus, the United States has a surprisingly rich history of waging this “other” 
American way of war in which airpower has often played a vital, albeit supporting role.  
One of the first of these post-World War II small wars, the Anti-Huk Campaign in the 
Philippines, came directly on the heels of the Allied victory in the Pacific.  The second 
case presented here, the civil war in El Salvador, was waged nearly three decades later 
and continued past the end of the Cold War.  While these two small wars are separated by 
differences in terms of time period, location, and technologies utilized, they both 
highlight the importance of the non-kinetic roles of airpower.  Perhaps more significantly, 
they both represent examples of the potentially devastating political ramifications 
resulting from the inappropriate or indiscriminate use of airpower.   
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B THE ANTI-HUK CAMPAIGN 
1. Background 
On 29 March 1942, the Huko ng Bayan laban sa Hapon (The People’s Anti-
Japanese Army), or shortened to the Tagalon acronym, Hukbalahap, was formed as the 
military arm of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP).  Nicknamed the Huks, this 
guerrilla force served with distinction during World War II, but largely operated 
independently from the United States Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE)-sponsored 
guerrillas.129  Following the war, many former Huk guerrillas concealed their weapons or 
fled to the mountains. 
The PKP won six congressional seats in the 1946 elections, but were excluded 
from the legislature due to charges of using terrorist methods.  Landlord and police-
instigated violence escalated against the peasantry throughout the Philippines.  Following 
the assassination of a prominent PKP member, Huk veterans retrieved their weapons and 
incited a rebellion that would last until 1955.  The peasants rebelled not because of their 
relative deprivation compared to the local elites.  The major reason for discontent was 
that the traditional ties between patrons and clients had been severed.130  Simply put, the 
former clients wanted to own the land on which they had worked for generations.131 
In 1950 Ramon Magsaysay was appointed Secretary of the Department of 
National Defense.  His transformational vision for the struggle, along with assistance and 
advice from the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), resulted in 
the Philippine government establishing a number of social, economic, and military 
reforms aimed at exploiting the inherent division between the peasants comprising the 
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rank and file of the Huks and the revolutionary elites in the movement.132  Magsaysay’s 
influence and the government’s actions represent the turning point in the campaign.  Huk 
atrocities further alienated the guerrillas from a once-supportive population and hastened 
the end of the struggle.133  The war cost the Huks almost ten thousand dead.  More 
importantly, the Huks suffered over four thousand captured and nearly sixteen thousand 
surrendered.  By way of contrast, the Government losses were 1,578 dead.134 
2. Environment 
The Philippine Islands are an archipelago of over 7,000 islands stretching over 
1,800 kilometers from north to south.  The total land area is around 300,000 square 
kilometers: similar in total size to the state of Arizona, but spread out larger than 
California.  Of this territory, the islands of Luzon and Mindanao represent roughly 65 
percent of the total land mass.135  Topographically, the area is largely mountainous with 
narrow coastal plains and interior valleys.  Much of the area is enveloped by tropical 
forests that benefit from the temperate climate and seasonal monsoons.  
In 1950, the Philippines had a population of 20 million, 95 percent of whom were 
concentrated on the 11 largest islands.  Ethnically and racially, Filipinos were principally 
a blend of Malay, Spanish, Chinese, Negrito, and Americans.  Roughly 85 percent of the 
population was Roman Catholic, but the population in the southern islands was 
predominantly Muslim.  Historically, social cleavages were based primarily on religious 
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(Christian versus Muslim), socio-cultural (upland versus lowland tribes), and urban-rural 
differences rather than ethnic or racial ones.136 
3. Opposition Strategy  
The principle groups of the Huks represented a Marxist variant of an egalitarian 
insurgent movement.  Such movements seek to impose a new system of government 
based on the value of distributional equality and centrally-controlled structures.  
Egalitarian insurgents typically seek to mobilize the populace and radically transform the 
existing social structure.137   
The Huk Politburo determined that by January 1950 a revolutionary situation 
existed and directed that militarily the Huks convert from guerrilla operations to mobile 
warfare.  Attacks increased 1000 percent from their pre-1950 levels, as well as in 
boldness.138  By early 1952, however, the pressure from the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) in the form of large-scale offensives and constant small unit actions 
forced the Huks to revert to guerrilla operations for the remainder of the campaign.139   
4. Popular and External Support 
One researcher aptly described the importance of popular support during this 
period:  “The key to Huk success and persistence stemmed almost entirely from the 
active support of the local people.”140   Guerrilla leader Luis Taruc affirmed this notion 
by saying in 1948 that “the Huks can only hold out as long as it is supported by the 
masses.  No more, no less.”141 
The rebellion was at its strongest from 1949 to 1951.  Armed Huks numbered 
between eleven thousand and fifteen thousand: roughly equal to the armed strength of the 
earlier Hukbalahap resistance army, and enjoyed a massive support base of 2 million.  
The problem according to Huk leaders was not too few people to fill the active guerrilla 
army or the support groups, but insufficient ammunition and supplies for all who wanted 
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to join.142  Active support for the insurgents eventually waned largely due to the 
continued socioeconomic reforms introduced by the Magsaysay administration.143    
The lack of a contiguous external sanctuary severely handicapped the Huks and 
limited their ability to expand small-scale guerrilla attacks into a sustained wide-spread 
guerrilla campaign.144  The Huks, therefore, sought the refuge of the mountains near 
Mount Arayat in central Luzon in an area that they dubbed “Huklandia.” 
5. Framework for Analysis 
On 1 July 1947, the Philippine Air Force (PAF) became operationally 
independent of the army.  The fledgling service contained a single squadron of P-51D 
Mustangs single engine fighter-bombers and several C-47 transports, the military version 
of the famous DC-3.  All of the aircraft were based out of Manila, but could operate from 
outlying fields when the need arose.145  Other than participating in a few resupply 
missions, the Philippine Air Force (PAF) did not play a significant role during the first 
portion of the insurrection.   
After 1950, the air force increased in both size and function, largely influence by 
U.S. government aid and advice, and assumed a more significant role in the anti-Huk 
campaign.146  The air force received new single-engine propeller driven liaison aircraft 
such as the T-6s of Algerian fame and L-5s from U.S. stock.   The fighter-bomber 
inventory also increased with the addition of two squadrons of upgraded F-51 Mustangs.  
Unfortunately, only a handful of C-47s remained available and the PAF had but one 
helicopter to operate in southern Luzon.147  The limited type and number of aircraft 
affected the ability to wage several of the roles within the Leites and Wolf framework.  
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a. Input-Denial 
As in Malaya, denying the inputs to a largely endogenously-supported and 
elusive enemy under dense tropical foliage proved a difficult challenge for air forces.  
From the PAF’s perspective, supply lines between villages and Huk jungle hideouts were 
often inexplicably short.  To supplement food received by local sympathizers, the Huks 
started to develop “production bases” as early as 1948.  In reality, these bases were small 
farms run and protected by Huks that protected them from the government by widely 
dispersing their locations.  L-5 reconnaissance aircraft, along with information collected 
through infiltration and informants, often were used to find these bases.  These bases 
became vital once the Philippine Army severed Huk logistics in 1951.148  While certainly 
a viable input-denial target for airpower, the PAF did not often target these bases directly.  
Instead, government actions against the bases can ostensibly be described as counter-
production actions. 
b. Countering the Production Process 
Early in the conflict, the PAF damaged the government’s popular support.  
It often utilized its P-51 Mustangs to strafe and bomb suspected Huk locations.  These 
often indiscriminant attacks caused more damage to civilians than to the Huks.  Based on 
the substantial loss of popular support and resulting sympathy for the Huk cause, the 
government placed tighter controls and restricted the employment of the fighter-bomber 
aircraft by mid-1950.149 
On the positive side, the PAF did have a significant impact on degrading 
the production process of the Huks.  The ubiquitous L-5 dropped leaflets and broadcast 
PSYOPS messages, often utilizing a crude but innovative setup of megaphones and 
loudspeakers.150 
As the Huks retreated further into the mountains, their food supply 
depended upon what they could produce themselves at their established bases.  Similar to 
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the British in Malaya, reconnaissance aircraft were used to spot such cultivated areas.  
Unlike the Royal Air Force, however, the Philippine Air Force did not use chemical 
agents for defoliation.  Instead, the government flew agricultural experts over the areas to 
determine the approximate harvest time.  Just prior to the imminent harvest, ground 
forces would raid and destroy the base.151   
c.   Counterforce  
The effectiveness of the direct counterforce application of airpower in the 
Philippines is an issue that has generated considerable debatable.  Opposition leader Luis 
Taruc claimed in his autobiography that in six years of fighting, PAF air strikes resulted 
in killing only 12 guerrillas.152  Due to the stringent restrictions on the PAF fighter-
bombers, most of the targets were such that PAF aircraft utilized either 100-pound bombs 
or strafed with .50 caliber machine guns.  Attacks with larger ordnance were limited to 
large isolated base camps in the mountains.153  During the Huks’ transition into 
maneuver warfare, the Philippine Armed Forces began to enjoy synergistic advantages 
from integrated air support to ground operations.  During an operation near Mount Arayat 
in the summer of 1952, the PAF flew P-51 fighters as close air support to a BCT on the 
ground for the first time.154 
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While the merits of the direct counterforce of the PAF are questionable, 
the indirect counterforce role, in terms of transportation and aerial resupply, proved vital 
to the counterinsurgency effort.  Due to the limited number of C-47 transports and 
helicopters, the L-5, a surplus World War II artillery observation aircraft, often 
performed yeomen work for these essential duties.  In one prominent example, two BCTs 
received daily supplies flown by only two L-5 aircraft during a seventy-two day 
operation deep in rugged terrain devoid of roads.155  
The Philippine Air Force also developed a system of informers on the 
ground that worked in conjunction with daily reconnaissance flights to help identify 
where the insurgents were operating.  To keep the Huks from discovering the informers, 
the PAF utilized an elaborate set of signals.  These included the position of haystacks, 
farm animals, plows and other objects to communicate the size and location of Huk units.  
Defecting Huks represented prime sources of information and were often carried aloft to 
help locate their former Huk camps.156 
d.   Active Defense 
Similar to the T-6 in Algeria and the Morane in Indochina, the ubiquitous 
L-5 became synonymous with the PAF and represented government authority. The 
routine nature of L-5 flights lulled the Huks into a false sense of security.157  While 
grenades dropped from L-5s often aroused the Huks from their complacency regarding 
this simple platform, sometimes the passenger riding aboard the L-5 would have a similar 
effect on the Philippine Armed Forces.  Airpower author Wray Johnson explains: 
One of the more celebrated capabilities that PAF L-5s and other light 
airplanes brought to the pacification effort was the ability to extend 
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frequent visits by Ramon Magsaysay to the barrios and frontline military 
units.  By his mere presence, villagers and soldiers were often persuaded 
that the government cared about them.158  
Thus, it can be concluded that airpower in the Philippines played primarily 
a supporting role.  The physical environment of the Philippines, the nature of the Huk 
insurgency and their predominantly guerrilla strategy, and certainly the diminutive size of 
the PAF in terms of types and numbers of useful aircraft all limited the influence of 
airpower.  Transportation, resupply, and reconnaissance again made the most significant 
impact.  PSYOPS, support to civic action and close air support played important roles as 
well.159  As airpower researcher Colonel Kenneth Alnwick suggested, “The air 
operations and tactics of the Philippine Air Force were not in themselves decisive factors 
in the Huk campaign, but they were vital elements of Magsaysay’s integrated use of all 
the elements of national power to defeat the Huk insurgency.”160 
C.   EL SALVADOR 
1. Background 
The Civil War in El Salvador that spanned from 1980 to 1992 had its roots in the 
oligarchic aspects of the political, social, and economic features of the country.161  In 
October 1979, reform-minded military officers ousted authoritarian President Carlos 
Humberto Romero and established a five-member military-civilian junta.  Unfortunately, 
the junta was unable to deliver on its promises to alleviate the ills of the previous 
administration, and a three-sided struggle erupted among democratic reformers, the 
previous oligarchy, and revolutionary Marxist-Leninists.162 
Amidst the political chaos, the opposition groups amalgamated into one large 
alliance, the Marxist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).163  Rebel 
offensives achieved significant gains early in the war largely fueled by the harsh 
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government response punctuated by the draconian actions of “death squads.”  Under the 
newly elected Reagan administration, U.S. support to the El Salvadoran armed forces 
(ESAF) was fairly swift.  In 1981, the U.S. had provided nearly 50 million dollars worth 
of equipment, credits and aid.  This increased to nearly 85 million in 1982.164  Part of this 
aid came in the form of the training and advisory assistance of the U.S. Military Group 
(MilGroup) in El Salvador.  Thanks to political constraints, the size of the MilGroup was 
limited to no more than fifty-five U.S. military personnel in El Salvador at any time.165  
By 1984, a more robust and tactically-refined ESAF, led by the newly elected President 
Jose Napoleon Duarte, reclaimed the initiative from the rebels.  The war became a 
prolonged struggle with neither side seemingly capable of achieving military victory.   
Exhausted after over a decade of war, a cease-fire was agreed upon in 1991.  The 
Government of El Salvador (GOES) and the FMLN signed peace accords in early 1992, 
thus bringing a negotiated settlement to the war.   
2. Environment 
El Salvador is a small country encompassing just over 8,000 square miles, about 
the size of the state of Massachusetts.  Two east-to-west mountain ranges divide the 
country into three distinct topographies: a coastal region along the Pacific, a central 
plateau, and a mountainous region in the North.   The climate is generally tropical, but 
tends to be more moderate in the higher elevations.  El Salvador, unlike other countries in 
the region, does not contain jungles.  Instead, unpopulated areas are mostly grasslands or 
cultivated for crops.  The core of the Salvadoran economy was agriculture; and the center 
of the agrarian system was coffee which by 1978 accounted for over 53 percent of the 
value of all exports.166 
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At the outbreak of the war, El Salvador contained nearly five million residents 
resulting in a population density of nearly 570 people per square mile, the highest in all 
of Central America.  Eighty-nine percent of the population was Mestizo (of both Spanish 
and Indian descent).  Ten percent were Indian, and less than one percent Caucasian.167  
Salvadoran society was sharply dividend into elite, middle, and lower classes.  While 
only comprising 2 percent of the population, the elite helped establish the oligarchic 
government, owned more than half of the arable land, and generated one-third of the 
nation’s annual income.168  The lower class comprised nearly 90 percent of the 
population, lived in rural areas, and toiled largely as seasonal wage laborers.  As defense 
analyst Benjamin Schwarz observed, “Under a basically feudal structure, with the most 
skewed land tenure system in Latin America, a tiny elite ruled—but did not govern—an 
increasingly impoverished majority.”169  
3. Opposition Strategy  
Similar to the Huks in the Philippines, the principal groups of the FMLN were 
Marxist egalitarian insurgents.  The FMLN, however, was comprised of multiple 
independent groups that pursued several strategies, including military-focus and 
protracted-popular-war approaches, simultaneously.170 
The FMLN initially utilized a strategy seeking quick victory through military 
action, imitating the 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua.  Largely influenced by U.S. 
assistance and eventual Salvadoran military successes, however, the FMLN dropped this 
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strategy for one of a prolonged people’s war punctuated by political warfare of terrorism 
and assassination of government officials.171 
4. Popular and External Support 
Most of the ESAF viewed Nicaragua as the FMLN’s primary sponsor.  The 
United States, however, looked beyond Nicaragua’s participation and saw the FMLN as 
an auxiliary force of the Cuban and Soviet regimes.172  The flow of materiel to the 
FMLN was of importance to both U.S. and Salvadoran strategies.  But despite accurate 
U.S. information regarding the logistical flow, the sophistication of the external supply 
network stymied both governments.  U.S. intelligence agencies understood that many 
shipments came through Cuba, were then transported to Nicaragua, and then shipped 
overland through neighboring Honduras or Guatemala before reaching El Salvador.  
Others were ferried directly from Nicaragua to El Salvador by boat, canoe, or even small 
planes.173 
The FMLN also had considerable popular support within the borders of El 
Salvador.  A 1991 Rand study suggested that the FMLN acted as a de facto local 
government in about 30 percent of the country.  Up to 40,000 clandestine militia forces 
aided the FMLN by gathering intelligence, carrying out sabotage and hit-and-run attacks, 
and joining the regular guerrilla forces when needed.174  More than 95 percent of the 
guerrilla combatants utilized by the FMLN came from the peasant class of El 
Salvador.175 
5. Framework for Analysis 
When the war began, the Salvadoran Air Force (FAS) had approximately 20 
obsolete helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, mostly dating from the 1950s and imported 
from either Israel or France.  One of the FMLN’s most significant military victories came 
on 27 January 1982 when 100 guerrillas infiltrated the main airfield at Ilopango and  
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destroyed nearly half of the Salvadoran air force: five Ouragan single-seat jet-powered 
fighter-bombers, six UH-1Hs transport helicopters, and three C-47s while damaging an 
additional five aircraft.176 
Throughout the war, the United States augmented the FAS with ever more 
capable aircraft.  The result of continued upgrades saw the FAS grow to over 135 aircraft.  
These included A-37s for close air support, 0-2As for reconnaissance, and AC-47s for 
gunship operations.  Pilot training shortages and ineffectual maintenance procedures, 
however, hobbled the FAS.  In 1987, for example, there were only 70 active pilots for the 
fleet of 135 aircraft.  During the same year the FAS averaged a daily operationally ready 
rate of less than 50 percent.177  While often limited, the airpower of the Salvadoran Air 
Force did play a significant role, although not always positive, in terms of the framework 
presented here. 
a.   Input-Denial 
Where France benefited by limiting the supply of inputs entering Algeria, 
the U.S.-backed ESAF military faced almost the exact opposite in El Salvador.  The 
country possessed contiguous land borders with Honduras and Guatemala and a mere 30-
mile span of the Gulf of Fonseca separated El Salvador from Nicaragua.  Some 
researchers claim that because of environmental factors, effective interdiction of supplies 
and arms was not really possible.178  As one U.S. intelligence analysis in 1985 described 
the difficulty of interdiction:  
FMLN logistics routes are varied and dispersed at all levels.  It is even 
more complex than the Ho Chi Minh trail.  No single significant land route 
or method for moving the supplies exists.  At the strategic and tactical 
level the system is flexible and can be described best as a spider web.179 
The United States, however, did make a considerable effort to deny inputs 
along these routes.  Early in the war United States OV-1 two-person observation and 
reconnaissance aircraft and C-130s flying out of Honduras provided information on rebel 
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activity in the region.180  Because of the limited processing and dissemination capability 
of the FAS, Salvadoran airpower either could not or would not assimilate this information 
into their mission planning.181 
Thus, the FMLN’s ability to flow resources into El Salvador, and the U.S. 
and Central American allies’ inability to deny the input of these resources in a region 
largely dominated by the United States, proved critical to the FMLN’s ability to prolong 
the war for more than a decade.182  Where as the French reduced traffic by as much as 90 
percent in Algeria the FMLN in El Salvador sought, and likely achieved, a 90 percent 
success rate of infiltrating arms and supplies.183 
b.   Counter Production Process 
If airpower proved ineffective at denying inputs, it often was detrimental 
to countering the production process.  From the outset, the Salvadoran armed forces and 
their U.S. advisors sought to isolate the FMLN from the civilian population by aerial and 
artillery bombardment of rebel zones, destruction of crops, and the forced removal of 
guerrilla supporters in army sweeps through FMLN-controlled areas.184  Such aerial 
bombardments, however, were often indiscriminately executed, resulting in a high 
number of civilian causalities.  The resulting international human-rights issue forced 
President Duarte to issue rules governing the FAS bombing campaign and tightly limited 
aerial activities.185 
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The FAS also conducted more traditional counter production activities 
such as leaflet drops and aerial transportation in support of civil affairs projects.186  One 
unique use of airpower was to help establish government legitimacy by enabling and 
safeguarding the massive voter turnout in the 1984 elections.187  Debate exists about the 
efficacy of many of the psychological operations in El Salvador.  According to one 
prominent source, the expanded Psyops effort “still failed to make a discernible impact 
on either civilian enthusiasm for the Salvadoran government or the guerrilla’s 
commitment to his cause.”188 
Airpower author James Corum accurately describes the limits and adverse 
effects of the attempt to utilize airpower in the counter production role in El Salvador: 
As for an assessment of the FAS’s bombing campaign of civilian areas, it 
probably had some effect in harassing and disrupting the rebel strong 
holds, but it is doubtful that these benefits of the bombing campaign were 
greater than the considerable propaganda benefits that the rebels gained by 
being portrayed as victims of a repressive government in the international 
media.189 
c.   Counterforce 
While assistance from the United States built the FAS into the largest air 
force in Central America, its operational execution continued to mirror that of a small air 
force.  The singular objective of most FAS missions was clear:  kill the FMLN.190  Prior 
to 1984 the FMLN’s military strategy benefited such an omni-directional FAS focus.  
The massing of guerrilla forces into large groups to conduct conventional operations 
made them more vulnerable to attack, especially from the air, and increased their 
casualties.  This fortuitously coincided with the timing of FAS improvements in terms of 
training and hardware.”191 
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Political scientist Andrew Bacevich agrees, but cites the limits of airpower 
in the counterforce role during small wars of extended duration against an enemy with 
adaptive strategies: 
To be sure, during the war’s quasi-conventional phase, FAS was the big 
killer.  The Air Force’s A-37 close air support aircraft and its UH-1M and 
MD-500 attack helicopters proved extremely effective against large 
FMLN formations.  Once the guerrillas opted for a strategy of protracted 
warfare, however, lucrative targets all but disappeared.  Today, the 
contribution of the attack assets has become much less significant—a 
mammoth investment of capital that now provides only a modest return.192 
The FAS, while still enamored with expensive aircraft arguably better 
suited to conventional warfare, also employed effective indirect counterforce methods of 
airpower.  The FAS operated O-2A aircraft for both reconnaissance and intelligence 
gathering.  While often inadequate for developing an intelligence picture of the 
battlefield, the O-2s proved effective in dispersing FMLN troop concentrations.193  If 
contact was made with the enemy, the FAS could quickly transport company-sized forces 
for reinforcement.  The helicopter often proved the only practical means to transport 
troops throughout much of the country due to the mountainous terrain and ineffective 
road structure.194 
d.   Active Defense 
In early 1986 the Salvadoran armed forces began a more effective strategy 
to isolate the FMLN from its civilian support base.  Instead of aerial bombardment, 
government forces physically removed peasants from the Guazapa Volcano.  The 
campaign, dubbed Operation Phoenix, displaced 1,000 civilians and captured 500 
suspected FMLN combatants.195  While done on a much smaller scale than in Malaya 
and Algeria, such passive defense measures were repeated with similar impact on other 
civilian populations in rebel-held regions of El Salvador. 
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While no single aircraft stood out in El Salvador in terms of Leites and 
Wolf’s conception of aerial police, the most effective aircraft utilized by the FAS during 
the war was probably the UH-1.196  What the case of El Salvador does highlight are the 
practical dangers of an omnipresent and ubiquitous aerial force, especially as enemy 
tactics and antiaircraft capabilities improve.  In the first half of 1989 alone, the FMLN 
destroyed or damaged fifty-four aircraft of the FAS, more than the total of the preceding 
three years combined.197  During the same year, after the introduction of the SA-7 
surface to air missile, the FMLN shot down two aircraft in an eleven-day period.198  The 
presence of such weapons does not reduce the necessity for airpower in the active defense 
role.  It does, however, require that airpower forces be trained and equipped to effectively 
deal with the situation.   
D.   ANALYSIS 
Unlike Great Britain and France, the United States has often participated in small 
wars as an external power, seeking to assist a partner government with its internal threat.  
Such intervention can bring important resources and capabilities to partner countries, but 
it also risks stoking resistance and creating a dependent relationship with the host society 
and government.199  This was the case in both the Philippines and El Salvador.  One 
interesting similarity is that despite the large influx of aircraft and materiel, the American 
footprint remained significantly smaller than those of Great Britain or France, thus 
avoiding the Americanization of these conflicts.  This ensured that the conflicts remained 
struggles for the partner countries to win or lose.200 
Both cases also highlight the potential limitation of aerial firepower in a small 
war.  In both examples political intervention was required to restrict the employment of 
aerial bombardment to prevent the seemingly indiscriminant killing of civilians.  Again, 
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utility aircraft, such as the L-5 in the Philippines and the O-2 (and especially the UH-1 
helicopter) in El Salvador, proved to be assets easily adaptable to the changing 
environment of the particular conflict and remained extremely relevant regardless of the 
nature of hostilities.   
Finally, both the anti-Huk campaign and the civil war in El Salvador demonstrate 
that small wars are indeed not likely to be short wars and that decisive victory is not 
always attainable.  In cases such as these, victory may equate to stalemate.  The extended 
duration and indecisive conclusions to small wars are diametrically opposed to the desires 
of most airmen.  As Corum and Johnson suggest, “The search for a quick, decisive 
victory is an integral part of the Western military culture.”201  Unfortunately, such 
victories continue to be woefully absent during most of these wars. 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPER ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN 
SMALL WARS 
Most theorists would agree that the population plays an essential if not key role in 
a small war.  A pervasive school of thought when dealing with the struggle for the 
population is the familiar winning of the “hearts and minds” strategy.202  Professor Bard 
O’Neill suggests that the constant reiteration of the need for popular support by insurgent 
leaders demonstrates its centrality to insurgent thinking and that government campaigns 
and counterinsurgency literature acknowledge winning the hearts and minds of the people 
explicitly.203  Leites and Wolf, however, offer that such a “hearts and minds” view 
stresses popular sympathies and economic conditions by concentrating on the 
environment that evokes rebellion.204 
Where “hearts and minds” strategies emphasize the demand side of the problem, 
the framework presented in Rebellion and Authority focuses more on the supply side of 
the situation.  The authors offer two reasons for placing somewhat more emphasis on the 
supply side of the equation.  First, is that while both supply and demand are important, in 
most discussions the supply factors are either neglected or misconstrued.  Second, is that 
supply conditions are more responsive in the short run and can therefore be influenced to 
a greater degree.205  In terms of airpower, the supply side focus of the Leites and Wolf 
framework provides a more concrete basis to assess the potential influences of airpower 
than the somewhat amorphous notion, at least from the perspective of airmen, of winning 
“hearts and minds.”   
Having stepped back to look at individual instances of airpower in small wars, 
through the lens of Leites and Wolf’s framework, we can now take two steps forward to 
determine the proper role of airpower in this non-uniform arena.  The remainder of this 
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chapter analyzes the effectiveness of airpower in small wars by evaluating its impact in 
terms of contemporary roles, missions, and characteristics unique to airpower. 
A. AIR SUPERIORITY 
While most often regarded as freedom to attack, air superiority also involves 
freedom from attack.  For example, United States Air Force doctrine defines superiority 
as, “that degree of dominance that permits friendly land, sea, air, and space forces to 
operate at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.”  
The doctrine continues to define air supremacy as the degree of superiority where 
opposing forces “are incapable of effective interference anywhere in a given theater of 
operations.”206 
Because of the subsidiary role the military plays given the political context of 
small wars, the achievement of air superiority is often neglected or assumed as an 
implicit asymmetrical advantage.  During the Falklands Campaign, ground fire accounted 
for almost all aircraft losses (for both the Argentine and British air forces).  As author 
Robert Scales describes, this early experience made the Royal Air Force “reluctant to 
further risk their valuable aircraft against ground targets until they first established 
unquestioned air superiority and mastery over the troublesome Argentine anti-aircraft 
guns.”207  This is not particularly astonishing given the conventional nature of the 
Falklands Campaign.  What is more telling is the influence of such weapons during more 
protracted conflicts involving irregular forces.  The latter stages of the civil war in El 
Salvador exemplify this situation.  As a Department of State message summarizes:  “The 
introduction of state-of-the-art surface to air missiles into the conflict, however, has all 
but neutralized the tactical advantage of the air force, affected the morale of the ground 
forces, and reduced the aggressiveness of ground operations.”208 
The achievement of air superiority in a conflict, regardless of its size or nature, is 
an overarching principle in that it allows successful conduct of the remaining capabilities 
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of airpower.  Most advances within air superiority predominantly apply to large wars.  
The most significant threat to air superiority in small wars comes from the ubiquitous 
ground threats of relatively inexpensive small arms and shoulder-fired missiles.  
Defeating, or at least diminishing, the pervasiveness of these weapons remains perhaps 
the paramount issue for airpower in small wars.  Without some relative measure of air 
superiority from these weapons, the additional capabilities of airpower in small wars are 
greatly diminished. 
B. INTERDICTION AND LIMITING OF RESOURCES 
The United States Air Force terms its distinctive worldwide interdiction capability 
as global attack.  Doctrine suggests that airpower forces, such as the United Sates Air 
Force, “with its growing space forces, its intercontinental ballistic missiles and its fleet of 
multirole bombers and attack aircraft supported by a large tanker fleet, is ideally suited to 
such operations.  [The] service is able to rapidly project power over global distances.”209  
Such a capability is vital in prosecuting large wars, but high-budget items such as 
ballistic missiles, transcontinental bombers, and tanker fleets represent, at best, an 
adverse cost-to-benefit ratio given the protracted and politically sensitive nature of small 
wars.  Some noted analysts even argue that the entire concept of major military 
operations involving such large, sophisticated military forces may be a thing of the past 
or at least an aberration.210  The cases presented here demonstrate the oftentimes limited 
ability of even these most technologically advanced airpower forces to interdict men, 
materiel, and support from both external and internal sources during small wars.   
When dealing with external support, it critical to have a clear picture of the 
amount of support being provided and the impact it has.  This is necessary to avoid 
misdirecting limited resources if the external support is not a major contributor to the 
opposition’s gains or is of little or no consequence.  Exaggeration of Soviet and Cuban 
assistance to the FMLN early in the civil war in El Salvador greatly led to mistakes 
regarding the real reasons for the insurgents’ initial successes: the indigenous support 
they received.  A study of El Salvador that over emphasized the external support but 
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ignored the political, social, and economic elements could lead to the faulty conclusion 
that simply denying external inputs could have quelled the insurgency.211   
The French experience in Algeria, on the other hand, represents a situation where 
support from external sources, and an appropriate input-denial strategy, was paramount.  
The barrages erected by the French, while extremely costly in terms of men, resources, 
and airpower assets, proved vitally important and effective at limiting support from 
Algeria’s neighboring bases of support.  Then again, many opposition forces encountered 
in a small war environment do not require large, continuous sources of inputs.  Both the 
Huks in the Philippines and the MCP in Malaya remained effective fighting forces for 
nearly a decade (twelve years in the case of Malaya) despite the absence of an external 
source of support or sanctuary.  These cases, along with that of the FMLN, demonstrate 
the effectiveness of opposition forces, especially those waging guerrilla warfare, at 
supporting themselves largely if not exclusively through endogenous sources.  Supply 
lines from endogenous sources are vastly reduced in length thus making their detection 
and interdiction by airpower that much more difficult.  
Finally, all of the cases presented here (save that of the French in Algeria) 
demonstrate the limiting effect the environment imposes on the interdiction capability of 
airpower.  The topographical features and dense foliage of Malaya, Indochina, the 
Philippines, and El Salvador all afforded opposition groups with internal sanctuaries.  
The environment itself helped neutralize the technological capabilities of airpower and 
reduced the opposition to at best, fleeting targets of opportunity.212  Even the 
geographical remoteness and harsh climactic conditions of the Falkland Islands limited 
the interdiction capabilities of British airpower.  Where the topography benefits the 
opposition, airpower had a more enduring effect in terms of psychological operations and 
disruption of enemy activities. 
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C. HARASSMENT, DISRUPTION, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
One important benefit that favorable topography affords opposition forces is the 
seclusion of their base areas.  Such bases allow the opposition to plan, train, rest, 
recuperate, marshal equipment, and organize people in relative security.213  While such 
static targets certainly pose viable targets for interdiction by airpower, they tend to 
remain elusive to detect and attack.  The more elusive the opposition becomes the more 
prominent “soft” measures of airpower turn out to be.   Leites and Wolf suggest that it is 
possible to reduce the productivity of the opposition.  They suggest that even large-scale 
attacks by B-52 bombers, while not necessarily crippling insurgents from kinetic effects, 
tend to disrupt the enemy by means as simple as causing them to lose sleep.214  Airpower 
author Philip Towle agrees.  He contends that “In areas where no civilians are living and 
where guerrillas are operating, attacks by heavy bombers can have a considerable impact 
on rebels’ morale, even when they do not actually kill or wound many of them.”215 
The implied drawback in Towle’s statement is critically important.  Rarely in a 
small war is the opposition separate from the civilian population.  Any attack can have 
dramatic consequences.  Given the diplomatic and asymmetric context of small wars, any 
negative effects of air attacks, especially large-scale effects given the considerable 
destructive capacity of conventional bombers, can have strategic-level impacts.  Simply 
put, “there is a political price to pay when airpower in the form of air strikes is used.”216   
Both the Salvadoran and Philippine Air Forces had to be forced to limit their attacks in 
order to reduce the actual and perceived indiscriminateness of their bombings.  Similarly, 
French operations in Indochina and Algeria (both in the air and on the ground) created 
adverse reactions when they were conducted with wanton disregard for the population.  
In Algeria, the French sweeps through populated areas served to be “the best recruiting 
agent” for the FLN insurgents.217 
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One commonality to be found across the cases (except for the Falklands for 
reasons discussed in Chapter III) was the beneficial effect of airborne psychological 
operations.  Both leaflet drops and broadcast flights were employed in every theater, 
demonstrating the relative ease with which aircraft can be retrofitted to perform such 
duties.  Even so, these cases suggest an important caveat to the proper utilization of 
airpower for psychological operations.  The involvement and knowledge of indigenous 
personnel is paramount to the success of such operations.  Psyops are ineffective if they 
do not transmit the desired information or are not received and interpreted appropriately.  
An excellent example from the Philippines was the infamous “The Eye Leaflet” which 
simply consisted of a pencil drawing of a single open eye.  While not overly compelling 
to most Westerners, a Huk soldier who found one these leaflets was “shaken at the 
thought of his secure territory being violated by some unseen enemy.”218  While the 
positive effects of psychological operations were often difficult to quantify, in most every 
case they played a significant role.  In Malaya, for example, the psychological weapon 
“made a major contribution to the slow erosion and ultimate collapse of the insurgent’s 
morale that presaged their final defeat.”219 
D. AIR ATTACK AND THE KINETIC APPLICATION OF AIRPOWER 
While most analysts would likely agree that there is no single correct solution for 
applying the kinetic effects of airpower in small wars, these case studies push this 
assertion one step further.  They demonstrate that the effectiveness of airpower as the 
traditional instrument of applying kinetic force is directly related to the proclivity of the 
opposition to assume the guise of a conventional belligerent.  While not fundamentally 
astonishing, this finding has profound implications for the training and fielding of 
airpower forces.  On the conventional end of the continuum of small wars, represented by 
the Falklands Campaign, it is easy to see that the overwhelming positive impact of 
airpower was in the counterforce role.  Supporting roles such as reconnaissance and 
transport were important, but not as singularly critical as the ground attack and air 
defense missions. 
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Authors James Corum and Wray Johnson accurately suggest that when the enemy 
concentrates “in large forces and aspire[s] to conventional or positional warfare, they 
become especially vulnerable to air attack.  Conventional military operations require 
heavy weapons, logistical bases, lines of communication, and headquarters element to 
coordinate operations.  All of these are excellent targets for airpower.”220 
The kinetic application of airpower, and its related psychological effects, does 
have limitations.  General Vo Nguyen Giap noted that his forces ability to stand up to 
firepower increased with experience.  The terrifying effects of napalm and high explosive 
ordnance that proved so successful during the battle for Vinh-Yen passed quickly as the 
Viet Minh began to realize that these weapons were not as destructive as they first 
appeared to be.221  This was certainly not the case for Argentinean soldiers who 
continued to be unnerved by British bombardment.  Author Robert Scales provides an 
interesting analysis of why the psychological effect of bombings that were successful in 
the Falklands became a wasted effort in Vietnam: 
The answer lies in several factors: the nature of the war, the character of 
the enemy, and the manner in which the program of fire was conducted.  
The old saying, ‘familiarity breeds contempt,’ applies here.  No matter 
how effective shell fire might be, in the course of a long war soldiers learn 
to accommodate and become accustomed to even the most fearsome 
bombardment, particularly when they realize that shelling often does little 
harm.   But in a short and sharp conflict like the Falklands, the Argentines 
did not have time to become inured.222 
Thus, in addition to weighing the potential negative strategic-level effects of 
bombing, given the possible backlash in popular support at the perceived 
indiscriminateness of aerial bombardment, airpower theorists must consider yet another 
factor in the diminution of the effectiveness of aerial attack.  If repeated bombing actually 
inures enemy combatants, both uniformed and irregular, then popular tactics, techniques, 
and procedures such as high speed low altitude buzzing of enemy forces during “show of 
force” passes are not likely to cause appreciable reactions in the opposition following 
their first few exposures. 
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In a protracted small war, this combination of popular estrangement and 
opposition inurement resulting from aerial attacks could prove to be the single most 
depreciatory aspect to the overall effectiveness of  airpower. 
E. SURVEILLANCE, PRESENCE, AND INFLUENCE 
The United States Marine Corps’ revision to the eminent Small Wars Manual of 
1940 contends that small wars are—first and foremost—information wars.223  
Surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering all fall within this rubric and 
essentially serve as the dominant aspect of the counterforce application of airpower.  
Maintaining informational advantages even surpasses the direct application of traditional 
firepower.  A key facilitator of airpower’s information gathering ability is embedded in 
the unique advantages of airpower to cover vast amounts of territory. 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung greatly valued expansive territory.  He claimed that, “the 
enemy, employing his small forces against a vast country, can only occupy some big 
cities and main lines of communication and part of the plains. Thus there are extensive 
areas in the territory under his occupation which he has had to leave ungarrisoned, and 
which provide a vast arena for our guerrilla warfare.”224  Airpower, utilizing its speed, 
range, and persistence diminishes the importance of the size of territory that previously 
benefited the opposition.  The French experience in Algeria, a country three times the 
size of Texas, offers a superlative example.  Reiterating the words of Arthur Campbell, 
“Before the onset of air power, Lawrence and his Arabs were able to retreat at will into 
the Arabian deserts, but the FLN [National Liberation Front] in Algeria, opposed by a 
powerful French air force, were denied access to the vast reaches of the Sahara.”225 
Again, two significant caveats exist regarding the role of airpower in surveillance 
and influence.  First, as discussed previously, environmental factors significantly degrade 
the ability of airpower platforms to detect and observe elusive opponents.  This 
limitation, however, is mitigated by the persistent presence of airpower which limits the 
ability of elusive opponents to mass for sizeable attacks.  The FMLN in El Salvador, the 
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Huks in the Philippines, and the Viet Minh in Indochina all tred into large-scale 
conventional attacks.  In all three cases, the massed enemy forces proved easily 
identifiable and lucrative targets for air attacks.  The result of punishing air strikes forced 
all three opposition groups to withdraw from positional warfare back to guerrilla 
operations.  While not eliminating enemy activity, airpower can help confine a conflict 
and deny the opposition some escalation options.226 
The second caveat is that the rural locus for opposition is gradually being eclipsed 
by urban environments.  Large sprawling cities, often ringed by unmapped shantytowns, 
provide an increasingly attractive and conducive environment for insurgent activity.  
Large numbers of unemployed and restless men provide a vast pool for recruitment, and 
densely packed disgruntled residents serve as an echo chamber for popular 
movements.227  The explanation for this development is simple: urban environments are 
swelling rapidly.  The United Nations estimates that while rural populations will remain 
virtually steady, urban populations will continue to soar.  By the year 2025, more than 5 
billion people, or 61 percent of humanity, will be living in cities.228  Urban environments 
have long stymied the effectiveness of airpower.  Even during the Battle for Stalingrad in 
World War II, General Chuikov, the Soviet commander knew the limiting effects of 
urban terrain on airpower when he stated: 
I came to the conclusion that the best method of fighting the Germans 
would be close battle, applied day and night in different forms. We should 
get as close to the enemy as possible so that his air force could not bomb 
our forward units. . . . it seemed to me that it was precisely here, in the 
fighting for the city, that it was possible to force the enemy into close 
fighting and deprive him of his trump card—his air force.229 
                                                 
226 Vick et al., Air Power, 109. 
227 Vick et al., Air Power, 17. 
228 Eugene Linden, “The Exploding Cities of the Developing World,” in Globalization and the 
Challenges of a New Century. Edited by Patrick O’Meara, Howard D. Mehlinger, and Matthew Krain 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 407. 
229 Vasil I. Chuikov, The Battle for Stalingrad (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964), 72.  
As cited in  Major Timothy Staffold, “The Role of Airpower in Urban Warfare: An Airman’s Perspective,” 
Air Command and Staff College, Wright Flyer Paper no. 6 (December 1998), 
http://aupress.au.af.mil/Wright_Flyers/Text/wf06.pdf (accessed April 2006), 15. 
68 
A final consideration when dealing with the topic of airpower presence is the 
exceptional cost of contemporary airpower platforms.230  Naturally, rising costs equate to 
fewer available aircraft.  The tangential effects this reduction of aircraft have on the 
presence and influence aspect of airpower, while not necessarily quantifiable, are likely 
to be profound.  In every case presented in this work, low-cost but dependable aircraft fit 
the role envisioned by Leites and Wolf of the so-called “aerial police” aircraft which 
provide both the symbol and the reality of the government’s presence and protection.  
One potential remedy to the conundrum of high-cost but low-quantity fleets of modern 
aircraft is the increased production and utilization of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to 
fill the role of the aerial police force.  While the merits and detriments of such a solution 
are beyond the scope of this work, it suffices to say that UAVs may have a difficult time 
performing to the same caliber as venerable aircraft like the L-5, T-6, T-28, and UH-1 did 
in the cases presented here.231 
F. AIR MOBILITY AND SUPPLY 
If the kinetic role of airpower is limited in the small war environment, the roles of 
air mobility and supply continue to be the cornerstone of airpower support.  Regarding 
the supporting role of airpower in small wars, as exemplified in every case presented in 
this thesis, the regional-mobility aspect of supplying, resupplying, and supporting fielded 
forces—whether military, political, or even friendly guerrilla forces—can become the 
determining factor in the campaign’s overall strategy.   
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During the Falklands Campaign, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage 
considered that “the transport force was vital to the success of the whole operation for the 
reconquest of the Falklands.”232  Regarding air transport in Malaya, Colonel Dennis 
Drew suggests that “there is total agreement about the importance of air transport to the 
counter insurgency effort” and that air transport was the RAF’s key role in the Malayan 
Emergency.233  The air mobility and supply efforts of the French and United States, 
however, highlight two closely related adverse effects of airpower. 
First, the French demonstrated the over-reliance on a single source of supply.  
Airpower units were stretched to the absolute limits for both man and machine.  The ill-
fated attempt to occupy Dien Bien Phu as an outpost exclusively supplied by airpower is 
testament to this drawback.  In addition to the limits imposed by the small number and 
configuration of the supply aircraft, additional factors such as adverse terrain, weather, 
and improved enemy defenses negated the ability of the transports to effectively supply 
the outpost against the siege of the Viet Minh.  Second, and closely related to the first, is 
the over-reliance on the transport ability of airpower, especially that of rotary-wing 
aircraft.  Andrew Bacevich explains the considerable drawback to the extensive use of 
helicopters in revolutionary wars: “In a war that pays a premium for being among the 
people, the UH-1 has made the ESAF into an army that spends too much time above the 
people.”234  Counterinsurgency strategist Colonel John Waghelstien agrees with this 
contention.  He contends that forces should be “among the population, on patrol, in small 
numbers, showing the flag and talking to the villagers, not flying over them at 5,000 
feet.”235  Simply stated, the air mobility capability of airpower must be used to support, 
and not supplant, ground force maneuver and interaction with the population. 
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G. ASSESSMENT 
As stated previously, small wars are conflicts in which the political and 
diplomatic context, and not the military disposition of the combatants, is often the 
determining factor.  Author Mark Clodfelter suggests that “Air power’s political efficacy 
varies according to many diverse elements and that no specific formula guarantees 
success.”236  It would be denigrating and blinding to suggest that a universal principle 
exists to determine the proper role of airpower in small wars.  These six cases and the 
analysis in this chapter suggest that the typologies of no two conflicts were ever identical 
and the application of airpower varied accordingly.  In general, however, it seems 
reasonable to assert that the non-kinetic roles of airpower are vastly more important than 
kinetic roles; environmental factors will weigh heavily on every airpower role and 
mission; and mobility, supply, and resupply often prove to be the most vital airpower 
contributions in support of the overall campaign in a small war. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
THE APPLICATION OF AIRPOWER 
As can be seen, no two small wars are exactly the same.  The opposition pursues 
various goals through multiple and often changing strategies, using a variety of 
techniques and methods, and often poses different threats to the established 
government.237  These small wars are not a new phenomenon and most Western 
countries have felt the frustrations they cause.  Since World War II, as Martin van 
Creveld poignantly describes: 
[f]rom France to the United States, there has scarcely been one ‘advanced’ 
government in Europe and North America whose armed forces have not 
suffered defeat at the hands of underequipped, ill-trained, ill-organized, 
often even ill-clad, underfed, and illiterate freedom fighters or guerrillas or 
terrorists; briefly, by men—and, often, women, who were short on 
everything except high courage and the determination to endure and 
persist in the face of police operations, counterinsurgency operations. . . 
and whatever other types of operations were dreamt up by their 
masters.238 
Determining the proper role of airpower in conflicts such as these is a difficult 
undertaking.  With the benefit of years of analysis and intellectual thought, it is possible 
to analyze individual conflicts and appreciate both the positive and negative effects 
airpower played within the context of that particular setting.  It would, however, be 
unprincipled to offer more than a general ranking of importance to the various 
operational roles airpower played within the confines of even a single conflict, as the 
nature of most small wars continually shifts over the span of many years.  Beyond the 
generalities discussed in the previous chapter, this study will close by offering some 
additional considerations for the application of airpower in small wars.  
A. RECONSIDERATION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES 
Just as airpower doctrine and thought is more focused on large-scale conventional 
warfare, so are its typical organizational structures and command and control 
relationships.  And just as current doctrine limits the efficacy of airpower in small wars, 
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so does the dogmatic mantra of centralized command and decentralized control.  While 
the British structure during the Malayan Emergency serves as the canonical case of a 
successful organizational restructuring, the French had perhaps the most effective 
command and control system established.239  In both Indochina and Algeria, airpower 
assets were flexibly apportioned within sectors or smaller zones, and light observation 
and attack aircraft were assigned directly to individual ground units.  Furthermore, the 
organization of air force units mirrored that of the ground forces to further alleviate 
coordination problems. This flexible, decentralized arrangement increased military 
success and ameliorated traditional tensions between the services.240  Similarly, Rand 
researcher Alan Vick suggests that “It is more accurate and helpful to think of air 
power—from whatever service—as a partner with ground and other military forces rather 
than emphasize who is supporting or supported.”241 
B. MAXIMIZING THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIRPOWER 
Airpower provides the decisive flexibility that normally the opposition enjoys.242  
In most small wars, the enemy can move quickly, benefiting from a supportive or at least 
indifferent population.  Insurgents and guerrillas can live off the land when necessary and 
blend into the surrounding population when required.  When they choose to attack, they 
generally enjoy the advantage of the initiative.  They are able to choose the time and 
place to conduct operations and will often choose isolated targets, allowing them to attack 
then disappear before reinforcements arrive.243  A classic example was the predilection of 
the Viet Minh to attack and overrun geographically isolated French outposts in 
Indochina. 
Airpower provides one means to match the flexibility of friendly forces.  The 
speed and range of aircraft allow the rapid movement of ground forces over difficult 
terrain and obstacles to serve as reinforcements.  The ferret forces in Malaya, and tactical 
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troop movements in the Falklands and El Salvador exemplify this aspect of the flexibility 
provided by airpower.  Finally, the retargeting capability of strike aircraft and close air 
support platforms can be utilized once the opposition forces are identified. 
C. UNDERSTANDING THE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
Author Mark Clodfelter suggests that military technology and airpower capability 
have created “a modern vision of air power that focuses on the lethality of its weapons 
rather than on that weaponry’s effectiveness as a political tool.”244  Technological 
advances are certainly nothing to shy away from.  The establishment of independent air 
forces testifies to the fundamental importance technology plays in these services.  
Revolutionary shifts in technology have kept airpower in a nearly perpetual state of 
transformation.  The danger, however, resides in the voracious desire to embrace 
technology—an embrace that should neither outstretch capability nor supplant doctrine.   
Similarly, technological advances do not, in and of themselves, guarantee 
compatibility with all manner of warfare.  Embracing technological advances specifically 
optimized for large-scale war, by definition, limits the effectiveness of airpower in 
supporting small wars.  From a small wars perspective, the solution is not to inhibit 
technological advances, but to understand how such capabilities do and do not fit within a 
small war analytical framework (such as the one used here) as well as how they fit given 
the political and diplomatic milieu of small wars.  Andrew Bacevich explains the 
pernicious aspects of using technology specifically designed for larger wars: 
At the other end of the spectrum of conflict, however, technology’s role 
tends to be more ambiguous.  Selectively employed, it offers tremendous 
advantages.  Yet fascination with technological capabilities should not 
blind Americans to technology’s limitations in small wars.  Certain 
capabilities may be irrelevant or even counterproductive.  [Small wars], 
therefore, demand special caution in bringing to bear only those 
technologies that will have positive effects.245 
D. EDUCATION, INFLUENCE, AND LEADERSHIP 
As airpower theorist Colonel Dennis Drew suggests, small wars are not just large 
wars writ small, they are at least as different from conventional war as conventional war 
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is imagined to be different from nuclear war.246  Unfortunately, small war theory is 
woefully lacking in formal education opportunities for airpower professionals.  Education 
regarding the social, psychological, cultural, and political aspects of small wars should be 
established at military academies and staff colleges.247  Of special importance is the 
historical study of previous small wars to appreciate their defining characteristics, 
combinations of which may offer guidance regarding future scenarios. 
The lessons of this education will not be inculcated in the lower echelons without 
unrelenting support by professional senior military leaders.  Only through their guidance, 
actions, and programmatic decisions can the conventional one size fits all dogma of most 
airpower forces be overcome.248  Mark Clodfelter astutely summarizes the point: 
Bombing doctrine remains geared to fast-paced conventional war, and the 
conviction that such doctrine is appropriate for any kind of conflict 
permeates [airpower forces].  Until air commanders and civilian officials 
alike realize that air power is unlikely to provide either ‘cheapness’ or 
‘victory’ in a guerrilla war—and that success in such a conflict may well 
equate to stalemate—the prospect of an aerial Verdun will endure.249   
Without the influential support of senior military leaders, education on the subject 
of small wars will be dismissed as an aberration or passing fancy.  Without effective 
education, the advantages afforded by airpower within the context of small wars will 
likely be misapplied or underutilized.  Only by taking one step back to fully understand 
and appreciate the contextual basis of this form of conflict can airpower professionals 
take two steps forward to become the most effective fighting force possible, regardless of 
the nature of the conflict. 
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